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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on cancelling liquidity, information
generation and learning by holding private placements, and information generation,
learning and the trading dynamics of institutional traders during the 2007-2008 financial
crisis. The first essay examines cancellation activity of limit orders. We document a twofold increase in limit order cancellation activity over the last decade, and study the
determinants of cancellations and the change in cancellation activity through time. We also
examine the impact of order cancellation on market quality. We use an instrumental
variable approach and estimate a simultaneous equations model to overcome simultaneity
in the trading process. We find significant differences in cancellation activity in the post
Reg NMS environment, and differences in cancellation activity between exchanges.
However, we fail to find evidence that the increase in cancellations is detrimental to market
quality, despite concerns from regulators and traders.
In the second essay we examine how relationships influence trading behavior.
Specifically, we study whether or not financial intermediaries (insurance companies)
produce information via relationships with publicly traded firms established by investing
in the public firm’s privately placed securities (privately placed debt, or equity). We
contribute to the literature that asserts that financial intermediaries generate information
via relationships that they establish with their clients. We find some evidence that suggests
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insurers do generate information via the private placement relationship and use this
information to trade.
In the third essay, we study if institutional traders acquire information from the
assets that they hold and how this impacts trading decisions around the 2007-2008
financial crisis. Specifically, we test if insurance companies who hold mortgages exhibit
different trading behavior in their mortgage backed securities portfolio than insurers who
do not hold mortgages. We examine insurers’ trading behavior in light of several theories
of how institutions trade during crisis periods. We document that insurers who hold
mortgages have higher odds of being net disposers of MBSs prior to the crisis, than are
other insurers. We also find that, on average, insurers exhibited a flight to safety during the
crisis.
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ESSAY 1: CANCELLING LIQUIDITY
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1.1 Introduction
Limit orders play a significant role in the market, making up one or both sides of the
bid-ask spread a majority of the time (see Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 1999). Figure 1
of our paper shows that the number of limit order shares submitted and subsequently
cancelled more than doubles over the last decade. The premise of our paper is that the
increase in cancellations represents a substantive change in the manner in which liquidity
is provided to the market. Aided in recent years by computerized trading, liquidity can be
added and subtracted from the market in nano-seconds. This ability to quickly add and
remove liquidity leads to an increased level of cancellations.
We divide our study into four main sections. First, we study the impact of increased
order cancellations on market quality (as measured by effective spread, realized spread,
depth at the inside quote, size of the limit order book, or price impact). Second, we study
the determinants of cancellation activity and test theoretical predictions of the causes of
cancellations. Third, we examine the change in the sensitivity of order cancellations to
stock-level market conditions over time and how cancellation activity differs across
exchanges. Further, we investigate common, market-level, factors that determine order
cancellations, similar to the documented commonality in liquidity1.
We recognize that our research questions have causality running in both directions,
where market quality determines cancellation activity and cancellation activity determines
market quality. We address the issue of potential simultaneity in the trading process by

See Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka
(2001), who show, for example, that the spread of a particular stock is influenced by the spread for all other
stocks, excluding the stock of interest, which suggests market-level or common factors determine the
liquidity of a stock.
2 See page 47 of the January 14, 2010 SEC CFTC Concept Release on Equity Market structure. The document
calls for comments on several aspects of trading strategies that are used in today’s market environment
including asking for comments on topics such as market structure, policy, dark liquidity, etc.
1
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using an instrumental variable approach and estimate a set of simultaneous equation
models. We document changes in the dynamics of cancellation activity over the last decade
and differences between exchanges with regard to cancellation activity. However, we find
no evidence that the increase in cancellation activity has a detrimental impact on market
quality.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: We develop our hypotheses in the
next section. We discuss out data sources and resulting sample in Section 3. We present
the empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.

1.2 Hypothesis Development:
1.2.1 Market Quality and Cancellations:
Market quality is of significant importance to exchange executives, traders, and
regulators, and is the frequent focus of academic research. For example, on January 14,
2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) published a Concept Release on
Equity Market Structure. Concerned by how quickly liquidity is removed from the market,
the document raises questions about requiring traders to stand behind their limit orders
for a minimum amount of time – that is, instituting a minimum duration for limit orders.2
In response to the Flash Crash, the SEC, the Commodity and Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), along with exchange representatives held a joint meeting on June 22, 2010. The
purpose was to discuss issues of market quality that arose from the Flash Crash, where
orders were cancelled rapidly and size of the order book decreased dramatically. The

See page 47 of the January 14, 2010 SEC CFTC Concept Release on Equity Market structure. The document
calls for comments on several aspects of trading strategies that are used in today’s market environment
including asking for comments on topics such as market structure, policy, dark liquidity, etc.
2
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various exchanges reported on the functionality of their markets during the Flash Crash. In
a subsequent report from the SEC and the CFTC dated February, 18. 2011, regulators
recommend implementation of a, “uniform fee across all exchange markets that is assessed
based on the average of order cancellations to actual transactions effected by a market
participant.”
In addition to regulators’ concerns, institutional traders express concern about unstable
liquidity, coining terms such as “false liquidity” and “fake liquidity” to describe orders that
appear in the book, but are quickly cancelled. Anecdotally, institutional investors also
complain about getting “pennied” and “walked-up the book” when trying to execute their
trades. Similarly, traders voice concerns about market quality measures such as price
impact. The traders’ argument is that a highly liquid market should be able to absorb large
trades with minimal price impact. We spoke with a concerned institutional trader who
feels that he has a larger price impact, when working his trades, than he did ten years ago.
In light of these concerns, we seek to test whether or not increased cancellation activity
has a detrimental effect on market quality. A problem when investigating market quality is
there is more than one way to measure market quality. As we discuss in more detail in the
Data section below, we consider multiple measures of market quality such as measures of
round-trip trading costs, measures of the resiliency of the limit order book, and measures
of price impact. We posit the following hypothesis regarding cancellations effect on market
quality (stated as a null):

4

H1: There is no impact on market quality (measured as effective spread, realized
spread, depth at the inside quote, size of the limit order book, and price impact)
from the increasing level of cancelled limit orders.

1.2.2 The determinants of Cancellations:
Having stated that we believe there is a significant change in liquidity provision, we
now seek to understand why limit order traders cancel orders. Theoretical literature
suggests that limit order traders face risks because they are offering free options to other
traders, and must monitor their limit orders to avoid non-execution risk (when prices
move away from their orders and their orders become stale, see Copeland and Galai, 1983,
and Liu, 2009). According to Liu (2009), limit order traders also face the risk of their
orders being “picked off” by more informed traders, and must constantly monitor for
changes in market conditions and cancel or modify their orders to avoid these risks. The
following theoretical literature guides our choice of predictors of cancellations. Biais and
Weill (2009) build a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of the limit order book and
describe the dynamics of prices, spreads, order submissions, and cancellations. In the Biais
and Weill model, order cancellations increase with the frequency with which traders
contact the market. Similarly, in Large (2004), uncertainty about the arrival rate of
impatient market order traders can cause cancellations. Liu (2009) builds a model that
incorporates other market conditions such as spread, arguing that order cancellations
should decrease as spreads widen. Additionally, Liu predicts that larger stocks are
associated with more order cancellation activity.

5

These models lead to the second focus of the paper, which deals with the determinants
of cancellation activity. Since the above models describe conditions in the market that are
specific to a stock, we refer to the determinants collectively as stock-level market
conditions. Stock-level market conditions include measures such as, but not limited to, the
number of impatient orders submitted for a particular stock to the market center
(measured as the number of market orders and marketable limit orders), the number of
limit orders for a particular stock submitted to the market center, the stock’s spread at the
market center, and the market capitalization of the stock.3 We form the following
hypothesis (stated in the null):

H2: Stock-level market conditions have no impact on order cancellations.

As mentioned previously, cancellation activity changes through time, as evidenced by
the doubling of the rate of limit order cancellation (see Figure 1). We argue that one
external factor that induces more cancellation activity is the passing of Regulation NMS
(Reg NMS) in June, 2005. Among other things, Reg NMS makes the national, market-wide
limit order book more accessible (see Petrella, 2009; Smith, 2010 and McInish, Upson, and
Wood, 2010). Reg NMS Rule 611 mandates that orders be executed at the best price that is
immediately and automatically accessible (Petrella, 2009).4 This rule opens the door for
programmatic trading, which allows for high speed strategies and also allows traders to
monitor their submitted orders. With better monitoring, traders can avoid non-execution
See the Methodology section below for a complete list and definition of the stock-level market factors that
we include.
4 There are exemptions to Rule 611, for example, orders that are not immediately and automatically
accessible such as orders entered manually by dealers or specialists (Petrella, 2009).
3
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risk and the risk of being picked off by cancelling their orders. We seek to more formally
test the assertion of a change in cancellation activity by investigating if there is a change in
the sensitivity of cancellation activity to its’ determinants (stock-level market conditions)
in the pre- and post- Reg NMS environments. To do so, we divide our sample into two
periods (pre and post) based on the passing of Reg NMS.

H3: There is no difference in sensitivity of cancellation activity to its determinants
(stock-level market conditions) between pre- and post- Reg NMS periods.

We also study whether or not there are differences in cancellation activity between
exchanges. Numerous studies document differences between exchanges with regards to
measures such as spreads and price impact (Huang and Stoll, 1996), patterns of intraday
spreads (see Chan, Christie, and Schultz, 1995; and McInish and Wood, 1992), and quoting
behavior (Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 2001). We follow the tradition of comparing
across exchanges and investigate whether or not there are differences in cancellations
between exchanges. To investigate the differences in cancellation activity across
exchanges, we use a series of dummy variables for each exchange, dropping the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), so that each venue is compared to the NYSE. We form the
following hypothesis (stated as a null):

H4: There is no difference in the order cancellation activity between exchanges.
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1.2.3 Commonality in Cancellations:
We further investigate if there are common, market wide, factors that determine order
cancellations. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and
Brockman, Chung, and Perignon (2009) show that there are common factors that
determine spreads and depths. Specifically, they show that the spread (depth) of a
particular stock is influenced by the spreads (depths) of all other stocks, excluding the one
of interest. In other words, liquidity provision in a particular stock is influenced by
spillover effects from other stocks on the same exchange. This phenomenon is termed
commonality in liquidity. We investigate if there is commonality in another aspect of
liquidity provision, cancellation activity. We formulate the following hypothesis for
cancelling liquidity and follow similar research methods to that of Chordia et al. to test the
following hypothesis (stated as a null):

H5: There is no commonality in order cancellations.

1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics:
The main source of data for our study is the SEC’s Dash-5 data. We supplement the
Dash-5 data with variables such as price and volatility from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) data. We also obtain variables such as number of trades and
average trade size from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database.
The SEC’s rule 605 (formerly known as 11Ac1-5) implemented on November 17, 2000
mandates that market centers make available market quality statistics on a monthly basis.
The SEC requires that each market center report stock-level statistics such as orders
8

received, number of shares received, number of shares cancelled, effective spreads,
realized spreads, and speed of execution. These variables are reported for groups of order
types (market orders, marketable limit orders, inside the quote limit orders, at the quote
limit orders, and near the quote limit orders). Each order type classification, is further
categorized by order sizes (100-499 shares; 500-1999 shares; 2000-4999 shares; 5000 or
more shares). Therefore, while the stratification of the data offers a high level of detail, it
necessitates that we aggregate the variables across order types and order size categories to
arrive at a market center, stock level data set. For other studies that use the Dash-5 data
set and give detailed explanations of the data set, see Boehmer (2005) and Boehmer,
Jennings, and Wei (2007).

1.3.1 Market Quality Measures:
To examine the impact of cancellation activity on market quality, we first define our
measures of market quality. According to Kyle (1985), the finance literature distinguishes
three forms of market liquidity; 1) round-trip transaction costs (typically measured as the
bid-ask spread) 2) market depth or the size of the limit order book, and 3) resiliency of the
book. We attempt to capture these aspects of market quality by looking at effective spread
(a transaction costs measure), depth at the inside quote (a depth measure), size of the limit
order book (a size of book measure), realized spread (a resiliency measure) and price
impact (a resiliency measure), which are described in more detail below.
Market micro-structure literature uses the transaction cost of a round-trip trade, i.e.
bid-ask spread, to measure market quality. Effective spread, as opposed to bid-ask spread,
represents a better measure of the out-of pocket cost to a trader of completing a round trip
9

trade, since effective spreads accounts for the execution price and the price improvement
that might be obtained. Therefore, we use effective spread, which is reported in the Dash-5
data. The effective spread reported in the Dash-5 data is computed as twice the difference
between execution price and the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) midpoint. Because
this value can be positive or negative, we take the absolute value of effective spread, when
performing our analysis.
Another measure of market quality is resilience. A limit order book is considered
resilient if it recovers quickly from large trades. There are several factors that can impact
the resilience of the limit order book, such as sufficient activity (arrival of limit orders)
with sufficient depth to dampen the price impact of large executions. We use depth at the
inside quote and size of the limit order book as proxies for resilience. We calculate depth at
the inside quote from the Dash-5 data set as follows. We divide the number of shares
entered by the number of orders entered for the at-the-quote limit orders to give an
average size of each order. We then aggregate across order size categories for each stock
by calculating a weighted average where the weight is the number shares executed in the
order size category divided by the number of shares executed across all order size
categories. To calculate the size of the limit order book we sum the number of shares
entered in the “inside the quote,” “at the quote,” and “near the quote” order type categories
(i.e. we aggregate the shares of orders that are intended to enter the limit order book).
Traders who are making large trades are concerned with the price impact that they
have while working the trade to enter or exit a position. We therefore consider price
impact as one of our market quality measures. We follow Boehmer (2005) to calculate
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price impact from the Dash-5 data. Price Impact is calculated as half the difference of
effective and realized spreads.

In addition to price impact, another measure of the resiliency of the limit order book is
realized spread. Realized spread is reported in the Dash-5 data set and is computed as
twice the difference between the execution price and the NBBO midpoint five minutes later.
A resilient limit order book is not affected by trading and should, all else equal, have a small
realized spread. Since both realized spread and price impact can be negative we take the
absolute value of these measures when conducting our analysis.

1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
The sample period for our study is from June, 2001 to December, 2010. In selecting our
sample, we apply the following filters to our dataset. First, we remove any records with
noticeably incorrect values from Dash-5 such as negative volume executed, negative orders
submitted, or negative shares submitted. We also remove records where the market
center, the exchange, the date, or the ticker is missing or unidentifiable. Second, we require
that the firm be in both the TAQ and CRSP database. Third, the ticker must have a CRSP
share code of 10 or 11. Fourth, we require that the stock trade above three dollars. Lastly,
we trim the dataset at the one and ninety-ninth percentiles for any variable constructed
from Dash-5 data to remove outliers. Our final data set has 1203 NASDAQ-listed stocks and
960 NYSE-listed stocks.
11

Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for our market quality measures, cancellation
measures, and other variables used in our analysis. Our market quality measures are in
Panel A. We report a mean effective spread, averaged across all stocks on all market
centers, for our sample of $0.047 (median $0.027). Similarly average realized spread is
$0.017 (median $0.008), and price impact averages $0.015 (median $0.009). The mean
depth is approximately 900 shares (median 534 shares). The statistics for cancellations
and cancellation rate are in Panel B. The average cancellation rate for the sample is 44.7%,
measured as the number of shares cancelled divided by the number of shares entered for
all limit order types. While not a direct comparison, our average cancellation rate seems in
line with percentages of orders cancelled reported by Fong and Liu (2009) and Hasbrouck
and Saar (2009). Descriptive statistics for the other determinant variables are in Panel C.
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) and Fong and Liu (2009) document that cancellations are a
relatively frequent phenomena. Table 2 reports the mean and median cancellation rate by
each year in our sample. There is a noticeable increase over time, doubling from 2001 to
2010. Figure 1, also shows the time trend of the cancellation rate. The increase in the
cancellation rate points to a significant change in the nature of liquidity provision in the
last decade. In the next section we investigate how this change impacts market quality and
study what factors determine cancellation activity.

1.4 Empirical Results:
1.4.1 Cancellations effect on Market Quality:
We recognize that hypotheses 1 and 2 have causality running in both directions. For
example, we hypothesize that stock-level market conditions, such as effective spread,
12

predict order cancellations, and order cancellations predict effective spreads (where
effective spread represents a measure of market quality). To address or work around
simultaneity, researchers frequently use techniques such as Granger Causality or introduce
lagged variables to establish temporal precedence. For example, it can be argued that
effective spread is determined by the level of cancellations in the previous five minute
period. The monthly frequency of the Dash-5 data is not suited for using a lagged variable
approach because it is unlikely that effective spread is determined by the level of
cancellations in the previous month.
We therefore address the issue of simultaneity by using a Two Stage Least Squares
(2SLS) method to estimate a two equation simultaneous equation model similar to that
used in Hasbrouck and Saar (2011). We use the average market quality measure for stock j
on all other market centers, excluding market center i (mktqltynotmktctrij,t) as an
instrumental variable for the market quality measure (mktqltyi,j,t) of stock j on market
center i,. Similarly, we use cancellations for stock j not on market center i
(cancelsnotmktctrij,t) as an instrumental variable for cancellations of stock j on market
center i. 5 We use the following general model:

Market quality is measured as effective spread, realized spread, depth at the inside quote, size of the limit
order book or price impact
5
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where

i,j,t

is our market quality measure for stock j, on market center i, at time t.

The variable lnavgcancelsi,j,t is the natural log of the number of cancellations for stock j on
market center i, at time t.
In the model where market quality is our dependent variable, our main variable of
interest is lnavgcancelsi,j,t. In the equation where market quality is the dependent variable
we are testing our hypothesis regarding the impact of increasing limit order cancellations
on market quality. In this model, we also control for the stock-level characteristics that are
shown to impact market quality measures: price (inverseprci,t), volume (lnvoli,j,t), volatility
(volti,j,t), and trade size (tradesizei,t).
In the model where cancellation activity is the dependent variable, we follow the
aforementioned theoretical literature in specifying the model (see our development of
Hypothesis 2). We use the number of limit orders (lnnumordersi,j,t) placed at the market
center to proxy for the frequency with which traders contact the market as in Biais and
Weill (2009). lnnumordersi,j,t is defined as the natural log of the number of limit orders for
stock j submitted to market center i at time t. If lnnumordersi,j,t increases (i.e. traders
arriving at higher frequency), then we expect cancellations to increase.
Next, we use the number of market orders and marketable limit orders
(lnimpatientordersi,j,t) entered at the market center to proxy for the uncertainty in the
14

arrival rate of impatient traders as in Large (2004). We define lnimpatientordersi,j,t as the
natural log of the number of market orders and marketable limit orders for stock j
submitted to market center i at time t. We contend that an increase in the number of
impatient orders (market orders and marketable limit orders) reduces the uncertainty
discussed in Large (2004). Hence, lnimpatientordersi,j,t is an inverse proxy of uncertainty,
and we expect as lnimpatientordersi,j,t decreases that cancellations will increase.
For the model where effective spread is our market quality measure, our specification is
consistent with Liu (2009), who predicts that spread and market capitalization play a role
in determining cancellation activity. Following the theoretical predictions of Liu (2009) we
expect that cancellations will increase as spreads decrease and as market capitalization
increases. We also add other control variables based on previous empirical research
investigating the decision to cancel orders, such as trade volume, volatility, and market
fragmentation (see, for example, Ellul et al., 2007; Yeo, 2005; Brusco and Gava, 2006; Liu,
2009; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009; and Fong and Liu, 2010). We include year dummies (not
shown) in both the market quality model and the cancellation model to remove any time
trend.
We report the results of our analysis of cancellations’ impact on market quality in Table
3, Panel A. We estimate the model using five different measures of market quality: effective
spread (model 1 – column 3), depth (model 2 – column 4), size of the book (model 3 –
column 5), realized spread (model 4 – column 6), and price impact (model 5 – column 7).
Our main variable of interest in our market quality model is lnavgcancelsi,j,t. We start our
discussion of the impact of cancellations on market quality by examining our measure of
round trip trading costs, effective spread. Our estimation of Model 1 shows a negative
15

relation between cancellations and effective spread, implying increased levels of
cancellations are associated with improved market quality. However, the economic
significance of the improvement is small. For example, a ten percent increase in
cancellations is associated with one tenth of a cent ($0.001) decrease in effective spread.
Another of our market quality measures, resiliency of the limit order book, is proxied by
depth at the inside quotes and size of the limit order book. In model 2, where the
dependent variable is depth, we find that cancellations have a positive impact, increasing
depth at the inside quote. To illustrate, a ten percent increase in cancellations increases
depth by 2.2%. Consider the average depth at the inside quote reported in Table 1. A ten
percent increase in cancellations means that depth increases by about 20 shares (.022*900
shares). We find that cancellations are positively associated with the size of the limit order
book. Model 3 (column 5) estimates imply that a ten percent increase in cancellations is
associated with a 14.26 percent increase in the limit order book. Our estimation results
thus far are inconsistent with an increase in cancellations being associated with reduced
market quality.
Besides having sufficient size and depth of the limit order book, another aspect of the
resiliency of the limit order book is how much (or how little) a trade moves prices. In our
final analysis of the impact of cancellations on market quality, we consider two additional
measures of the resiliency of the limit order book: realized spread and price impact in
models 4 and 5, respectively. The results are mixed from the standpoint of statistical
significance, with cancellations leading to smaller realized spreads but larger price impacts.
However, the economic significance of the coefficients is minuscule. Overall, we fail to find
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evidence that the increased level of cancellations has a meaningful detrimental impact on
market quality despite concerns from regulators and traders.

1.4.2 The determinants of cancellations:
We test the theoretical predictions of the determinants on cancellations with
hypothesis 2. We find a positive relation between effective spread and the level of
cancellation activity (see Table 3, Panel B). This finding is consistent with previous
empirical work such as Yeo (2005) and Ellul, Holden, Jain, and Jennings (2007), but is
inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of Liu (2009). In Liu’s model, wide spreads
are associated with decreased marginal benefit to monitoring the limit order, and
therefore, are associated with decreased cancellation or revision activity. We find the
opposite, that increased levels of cancellations are associated with more narrow spreads.
Biais and Weill (2009) predict that order cancellations increase when the frequency
with which traders contact the market increases. We proxy for the frequency with which
traders contact the market with the number of limit orders placed within a month
(lnnumordersi,j,t). If more traders are accessing the market within a set time frame, the
frequency with which they are contacting the market should also increase. We find a
positive effect between the number of orders and number of cancellations in all five model
specifications. Therefore, our results are consistent with the predictions of Biais and Weill
(2009).
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Large (2004) predicts that uncertainty about the arrival rate of impatient traders
(market order and marketable limit order traders) can lead to increased cancellations. If
fewer market and marketable limit orders are submitted, then limit order traders’
uncertainty regarding the arrival rate of impatient traders should increase and lead to
more cancellations. Therefore, we proxy for uncertainty in arrival rate by using the
number of market and marketable limit orders submitted to market center i, for stock j, in
month t. We find that a decrease in the number of impatient orders (i.e. increased
uncertainty) of ten percent is associated with an increase in cancellations of 2.16 percent (10*-2.16). Hence, the results of our analyses favor of the theoretical prediction of Large
(2004).

1.4.3 The evolution of liquidity provision:
In this section we study the relation of changes in the patterns of cancellations with
respect to the determinants through time. We suggest that the implementation of Reg NMS
makes the limit order book more accessible and further opens a door for programmatic
trading to monitor market conditions and build trading algorithms. If computerized
trading allows limit order traders to more effectively monitor their limit orders, then we
expect that cancellation activity may differ later in our sample period. To test if there is a
change in sensitivity following the implementation of Reg NMS, we create an indicator
variable (igeRegNMS), which is one if the time period is after the implementation of Reg
NMS and zero otherwise. We then create a series of interaction terms, interacting the
igeRegNMS variable with each determinant of cancellations. The interaction terms allow us
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to test if there are changes in sensitivity between cancellations and the determinants of
cancellations in the pre- and post-Reg NMS periods. We expect that if the post-Reg NMS
period is associated with better monitoring and more cancellations, then the coefficients of
the interaction terms will be statistically significant and in the direction observed in Table
3, Panel B. We estimate the following simultaneous equations model via a 2SLS method
with year dummies (not shown) added to both the market quality model and the
cancellations model to control for a potential time trend:
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The results of our analysis are in Table 4. The indicator variable igeRegNMS shows that
the number of cancellations is 109 percent larger (100*[exp(.739)-1]) in the post-Reg NMS
period. We find that cancellations are significantly more sensitive to increases in effective
spread and volatility in the post-Reg NMS environment compared to the earlier period.
Cancellations are also more sensitive for larger stocks and stocks that have more impatient
orders submitted in the post-Reg NMS period compared to the earlier period, a result that
is consistent with the predictions of Liu (2009) and Biais and Weill (2009). Overall, the
results of Panel B in Table 3 and Table 4 lead us to conclude that a change in the nature of
liquidity provision occurs between the pre and post periods with regards to cancellations.

1.4.4 Differences in Cancellations between exchanges:
Next we investigate if exchanges exhibit different cancellation activity (hypothesis 4).
The Dash-5 data lists the exchange where each market center reports trades. All major
exchanges are represented in the data, and we create indicators for each exchange (NYSE,
NASDAQ, Amex, Boston, National (NSX), International (ISE), Chicago, ARCA, CBOE, and
BATs) dropping the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) so that coefficients are interpreted in
relation to the NYSE.6 We estimate the following model via 2SLS and include dummy
variables for the year (not shown) to account for a potential time trend:

For NASDAQ and Bats there are multiple exchange codes. NASDAQ has exchange codes Q, T, and X.
Exchange code X is NASDAQ OMX which used to be the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. Bats has exchange codes
Z and Y. For our analysis, we created dummy variables for each exchange code.
6
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The results of our estimation are in Table 5. All exchange indicator variables are
statistically significant, which shows that the cancellation activity on each exchange is
different than cancellation activity on the NYSE (the omitted exchange). Additionally,
results of a Wald test (unreported) between each pair-wise combination reveals that
cancellation activity is different on all exchanges from all others. Therefore, we conclude
that exchanges exhibit differences in cancellation activity.
1.4.5 Commonality in Cancellation Rates:
Finally, to test for commonality in order cancellations, we follow Chordia et al. (2000)
and Brockman, Chung, and Perignon (2009). We estimate the following model using firmby-firm time series regressions:
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where CancelRatej,t is the volume-weighted average (i.e. aggregated to the stock level)
cancellation rate for firm j, in month t. Our main variable of interest, CancelRateE,t is the
equally-weighted average cancellation rate of all other stocks on exchange E, excluding
stock j, in month t. We also add a series of control variables. ReturnE,t is the equallyweighted average return of all other stocks on exchange E, excluding stock j, in month t.
Lead and lag values of the exchange-level variables are also included. Voltj,t is the average
volatility of stock j in month t. Following the model specification of Chordia et al. (2000)
and Brockman et al. (2009), the control variables are included to isolate the effect of the
commonality factor (the contemporaneous CancelRate variable) by holding constant
market-wide price movements and firm specific volatility. The symbol ∆ denotes the
proportional change in the variable across successive trading months.
The results of the firm-by-firm estimation are in Table 6. The primary variable of
interest is the contemporaneous cancellation rate and its corresponding coefficient (β1). If
β1 is positive, then the stock’s cancellation rate is influenced by the cancellation rate of all
other stocks on the exchange, i.e. there is a spillover effect. Table 6 reports the percentage
of stocks where β1 is positive (column 4), not significantly different from zero (column 5),
and negative (column 6). We also report means and medians for the coefficients and R2s
for the firm-by-firm regressions.
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We find that all eleven exchanges have positive median coefficients, and that ten of
eleven have positive mean coefficients. Eight of the eleven exchanges have ten percent or
more of their firms with positive coefficients (see column 4). The NYSE leads this trend
with 70.6 percent of firms exhibiting positive coefficients. Our findings reject the null
hypothesis that there are no common, market wide factors that influence the cancellation
activity of a particular stock, and conclude that there is commonality in the cancellation
rates.

1.5 Conclusion:
We document a significant change in the nature of liquidity provision. The rate at
which shares of limit orders are submitted and subsequently cancelled increases two-fold
over the last decade. Additionally, cancellation activity reacts to its determinants
differently in the post-Reg NMS environment than in the earlier period.
We believe our study is timely in light of the continued discussion by regulators,
exchange officials, and traders concerning false liquidity and resulting market quality. The
debate is heated and evidence is largely anecdotal with little concrete evidence on the
impact of the changing nature of liquidity provision. We contribute to this discussion by
providing empirical evidence that speaks to concerns that have been raised. We find no
evidence that the increase in cancellation activity results in harmful effects on market
quality.
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Table 1
This table presents summary statistics for our sample. Panel A reports summary statistics for the market quality
measures used in the study. Effspreadmktctri is the effective spread of liquidity demanders (market and marketable
limit orders) on market center i, RelSpreadmktctri is the realized spread of liquidity demanders on market center i,
DepthAtQuotemktctri is the average order size of quotes submitted at the quote on market center i, AvgSizeOfBookmktctri
is the sum of the number of shares entered via limit orders to market center i, PriceImpactmktctri is the price impact
measured as half of the difference between effective spread and realized spread at market center i. Panel B reports
summary statistics for cancellations (Cancelsmktctri) at market center i and the cancellation rate (CancelRatemktctri),
measured as number of shares cancelled divided by number of shares entered, at market center i. Panel C reports
summary stats for control variables used in the study. Volumemktctri is the sum of the number of shares executed at
market center i, Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of price as reported in the TAQ database. TradeSize
is the monthly average trade size measured from TAQ. Herfindahl Index is Herfindahl Index to measure the
fragmentation of trading of a stock. #of Ordersmktctri is the sum of the number of limit orders submitted to market
center i. Impatient Orders is the sum of the number of market and marketable limit orders submitted to market center
i. MktCap is the market capitalization of stock j calculated from the CRSP database.
Panel A: Market Quality Summary Stats
Variable
Mean
25th Pctl
Effspreadmktctri
0.047
0.014
RelSpreadmktctri
0.017
-0.006
DepthAtQuotemktctri 899.141
229.063
AvgSizeOfBookmktctri 3,628,687.720 7,817.000
PriceImpactmktctri
0.015
0.002

Median
0.027
0.008
534.571
64,843.000
0.009

75th Pctl
0.053
0.031
1,111.430
1,099,619.000
0.023

Std Dev
0.062
0.060
1,036.010
11,743,895.600
0.029

N
2,746,800
2,746,800
2,160,781
2,746,763
2,746,800

Panel B: Cancellation Summary Stats
Variable
Mean
Cancelsmktctri
3,249,692.790
CancelRatemktctri
0.447

Median
24,490.000
0.416

75th
850,515.000
0.790

Std
10,936,007.660
0.358

N
2,746,763
2,551,456

Median
51,460.000
0.174
195.981
0.271
503.000
209.000
1,381,711.140

75th
249,135.000
0.257
309.126
0.553
6,586.000
1,304.000
4,685,124.120

Std
1,438,357.290
0.237
283.277
0.249
50,103.920
5,235.280
25,890,517.440

N
2,746,800
2,746,800
2,746,798
2,746,800
2,746,800
2,746,800
2,745,435

25th
1,050.000
0.079

Panel C: Control Variables Summary Stats
Variable
Mean
25th
Volumemktctri
477,824.010
10,600.000
Volatility
0.212
0.117
TradeSize
299.402
160.063
Herfindahl Index
0.390
0.204
# of Ordersmktctri
16,884.900
74.000
Impatient Orders
2,045.250
39.000
MktCap
8,055,867.000 492,012.800
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Table 2
This table lists descriptive statistics for cancellation rates by year.
Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Mean
0.291
0.318
0.399
0.396
0.380
0.351
0.376
0.478
0.528
0.604

Median
0.207
0.241
0.326
0.327
0.319
0.297
0.301
0.515
0.589
0.745

Std
0.299
0.310
0.344
0.341
0.332
0.312
0.332
0.359
0.366
0.367
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Minimum
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Maximum
0.998
0.998
0.998
0.998
0.998
0.998
0.998
0.998
0.998
0.998

Table 3
This table presents the results of: 1) an analysis of cancellations affect on market quality and 2) the results of
the analysis of the determinants of cancellations. Due to simultaneity, we estimate the following simultaneous
equations model via a two stage least squares (2SLS) method.

As an instrumental variable for our market quality measure at market center i, we use the average market
quality measure across all other market centers except market center i. Likewise, as an instrumental variable
for cancellations at market center i, we use the average cancellations at all other market centers except market
center i. The market quality measure (
) is measured as absolute value of effective spread in model
[1], the natural log of depth at the inside quote in model [2], the natural log of the size of the limit order book in
model [3], absolute value of realized spread in model [4], and absolute value of price impact in model [[5]. Year
dummies are included (not shown) to both models to control for a time trend. Panel A holds the coefficients
and p-values from the market quality model. Panel B reports the coefficients and p-values from the
cancellations model.
Panel A: Results of Market Quality Model
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
a1
Intercept
0.145***
1.580***
-13.138***
0.178***
0.086***
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
a2
lnavgcancelsi,j,t
-0.010***
0.229***
1.426***
-0.003***
0.003***
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
a3
lnvoli,j,t
-0.001***
0.148***
0.944***
-0.008***
-0.002***
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
a4
voltj,t
0.003***
-0.078***
-0.070***
0.024***
0.018***
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
a5
inverseprcj,t
0.004***
2.077***
0.538***
-0.065***
-0.103***
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
a6
tradesizej,t
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
-0.004***
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
a7
mktqltynotmktctrij,t
0.649***
0.001***
0.000***
0.003***
0.006***
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
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Table 3 cont
Panel B: Results of Cancellations Model
b1

Intercept

b2

|effspread|i,j,t
lndepthatlimiti,j,t

[1]
5.069***
(<.0001)
1.046***
(<.0001)

[2]
3.555***
(<.0001)

[3]
8.882***
(<.0001)

[4]
5.541***
(<.0001)

0.379***
(<.0001)

lnsizeofbooki,j,t

0.156**
(0.003)

|respread|i,j,t

-6.470***
(<.0001)

|priceimpact|i,j,t
b3

lnvoli,j,t

b4

voltj,t

b5

1-hhij,t

b6

lnnumordersi,j,t

b7

lnimpatientordersi,j,t

b8

lnMktCapj,t

b9

cancelsnotmktctrij,t

[5]
11.117***
(<.0001)

-0.225***
(<.0001)
-0.298***
(<.0001)
-0.629***
(<.0001)
1.859***
(<.0001)
-0.216***
(<.0001)
-0.239***
(<.0001)
0.000***
(<.0001)
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-0.259***
(<.0001)
-0.157***
(<.0001)
-0.580***
(<.0001)
1.779***
(<.0001)
-0.124***
(<.0001)
-0.260***
(<.0001)
0.000***
(<.0001)

0.000***
(<.0001)
-0.057***
(<.0001)
-1.291***
(<.0001)
0.000***
(<.0001)
1.559***
(<.0001)
-0.637***
(<.0001)
0.000**
(0.048)

-0.227***
(<.0001)
-0.251***
(<.0001)
-0.592***
(<.0001)
1.864***
(<.0001)
-0.223***
(<.0001)
-0.249***
(<.0001)
0.000***
(<.0001)

-23.428***
(<.0001)
0.000***
(<.0001)
-0.055***
(<.0001)
-1.267***
(<.0001)
0.000***
(<.0001)
1.559***
(<.0001)
-0.635***
(<.0001)
0.000***
(<.0001)

Table 4
This table reports the results of an analysis examining whether the sensitivity of cancellations
to its’ determinants changes after the implementation of Reg NMS. We estimate the following
simultaneous equations model via 2SLS:

Where igeRegNMS is an indicator variable that is 1 if the date is greater than the
implementation of RegNMS (June, 2005), and zero otherwise. Year dummies are included
(not shown) to both models to control for a time trend. Since our main concern is the model
for cancellations, we omit the coefficient estimates for the first equation, and only report the
coefficients for the second model. P-values are reported in parenthesis.
b0

Intercept

b1

|effspread|i,j,t *igeRegNMS

b2

lnvoli,j,t *igeRegNMS

b3

voltj,t *igeRegNMS

b4

hhij,t*igeRegNMS

b5

lnnumordersi,j,t *igeRegNMS

b6

lnimpatientordersi,j,t *igeRegNMS

b7

Lnmktcapj,t*igeRegNMS

b8

igeRegNMS

b9

|effspread|i,j,t

b10

lnvoli,j,t

b11

voltj,t

b12

hhij,t

b13

lnnumordersi,j,t

b14

lnimpatientordersi,j,t

b15

lnMktCapj,t

lnavgcancelsi,j,t
3.491***
(<.0001)
1.483***
(<.0001)
-0.279***
(<.0001)
0.089***
(<.0001)
-0.814***
(<.0001)
-0.250***
(<.0001)
0.443***
(<.0001)
0.135***
(<.0001)
0.739***
(<.0001)
0.093*
(0.061)
-0.003
(0.309)
-0.379***
(<.0001)
0.998***
(<.0001)
2.053***
(<.0001)
-0.578***
(<.0001)
-0.307***
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b16

(<.0001)
0.000***
(<.0001)

cancelsnotmktctrij,t
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Table 5
This table presents the results of an analysis of whether there are differences in cancellation activity between
exchanges. We estimate the following simultaneous equations model via 2SLS:

Where indicator variables for the different exchanges are included. For example iAmex is one is the
exchange is Amex and zero otherwise. Year dummies are also included (not shown) in both models to
control for a time trend. P-values are reported in parenthesis.
b0

Intercept

b1

|effspread|i,j,t

b2

lnvoli,j,t

b3

voltj,t

b4

(1-hhi)j,t

b5

lnMktCapj,t

b6

lnnumordersi,j,t

b7

lnimpatientordersi,j,t

b8

cancelsnotmktctrij,t

b9

iAmex

b10

iBoston

b11

iNational

b12

iISE

b13

iChicago

b14

iARCA

b15

iQNasdaq

b16

iTNasdaq

b17

iCBOE

lncancels
0.038***
(<.0001)
-0.001***
(<.0001)
0.000***
(<.0001)
0.001***
(<.0001)
0.009***
(<.0001)
5.362***
(<.0001)
0.000***
(<.0001)
0.708***
(<.0001)
1.246***
(<.0001)
-0.232***
(<.0001)
-0.319***
(<.0001)
-0.486***
(<.0001)
1.865***
(<.0001)
-0.201***
(<.0001)
-0.226***
(<.0001)
0.000***
(<.0001)
1.463***
(<.0001)
-4.367***
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b18

iNasdaqOMX

b19

iBATS

b20

iYBATS

(<.0001)
0.723***
(<.0001)
-0.755***
(<.0001)
0.878***
(<.0001)
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Table 6
Reports the results of firm by firm time-series regressions which are estimated using the following model:

Where CancelRatej,t is the volume weighted average (i.e. aggregated to the stock level) cancellation rate for firm j, in month t. CancelRateE,t is
the equally weighted average cancellation rate of all other stocks on exchange E, excluding stock j, in month t. ReturnE,t is the equally
weighted average return of all other stocks on exchange E, excluding stock j, in month t. Lead and lag values of the exchange-level variables
are also included. Voltj,t is the average volatility of stock j in month t. The symbol ∆ denotes the proportional change in the variable across
successive trading months. The main variable of interest in the above model is β 1. The second and third columns report the average and the
median for the β1 coefficients. Columns 4,5,6 and 7 report the percentage of firms with positive and significant coefficients, percentage of
firms with positive but not significant coefficients, percentagae of firms with negative but not significant coefficients, and percentage of firms
with negative and significant coefficients, respectively. The last two columns report the average and median R 2’s for the firm by firm
regressions.
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Exchange
Amex
Boston
National
International
Chicago
NYSE
NYSE ARCA
Nasdaq Q
Nasdaq T
CBOE
Nasdaq OMX
BATS

Avg. Coeff.
0.932
8.469
3.744
0.782
2.368
1.123
0.913
0.693
0.976
1.144
-0.423
1.198

Median Coeff.
0.665
1.467
1.254
0.572
1.159
0.899
0.915
0.677
0.093
0.572
0.552
1.238

Significantly
Positive
Coefficient
30.120
4.811
26.061
8.269
16.677
70.576
42.792
18.633
26.670
11.700
6.615
57.321

Coefficient Not
Significantly Diff.
from Zero
68.675
92.44
73.091
91.455
82.128
29.317
57.107
80.54
73.182
86.608
92.218
42.453

Significantly
Negative
Coefficient
1.205
2.749
0.848
0.276
1.195
0.107
0.102
0.827
0.147
1.692
1.167
0.226

Avg R2
0.285
0.343
0.620
0.416
0.277
0.815
0.169
0.260
0.212
0.553
0.422
0.624

Median R2
0.235
0.257
0.649
0.399
0.232
0.998
0.138
0.236
0.175
0.538
0.375
0.651

200106
200109
200112
200203
200206
200209
200212
200303
200306
200309
200312
200403
200406
200409
200412
200503
200506
200509
200512
200603
200606
200609
200612
200703
200706
200709
200712
200803
200806
200809
200812
200903
200906
200909
200912
201003
201006
201009
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Cancellation Rate

Figure 1: Cancellation Rate by month
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ESSAY 2: INFORMATION GENERATION AND LEARNING BY HOLDING PRIVATELY PLACED
SECURITITES
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2.1 Introduction
There is growing interest in how relationships or affiliations affect the flow of
information among financial market institutions and how this information is used to trade.
For example, Massa and Rehman (2008) study portfolio holdings of bank affiliated mutual
funds and find that these mutual funds appear to be the beneficiaries of information
generated by the bank in the corporate loan market, increasing their holdings in the firms
that borrow from the bank. Ivashina and Sun (2011) and Massoud, Nandy, Saunders, and
Song (2011) report additional evidence that supports the passage of information generated
from the syndicated loan market, where members of the syndicate use the loan-related
information to trade in the equity of the borrowing firm. Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov
(2009) and Jegadeesh and Tang (2010) report evidence that when a fund is affiliated or has
a relationship with a merger advisor, information is passed and used to trade in the target
firm. These studies emphasize how relationships can be a conduit for information flow and
can impact trading decisions made by financial market institutions.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the research on how relationships affect
trading by examining relationships established in the market for privately placed
securities. Specifically, we study insurance companies who establish relationships with
publicly traded companies by investing in privately placed securities issued by the publicly
traded firm. As we contend below, there is reason to believe that relationships established
in the market for private placements generate information about the issuing firm, and in
turn this information is used to trade in the public equity of the firm. We examine two
types of private relationships; 1) private debt relationships and 2) private equity
relationships. To examine if information is generated via the relationship we measure the
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performance of trades (in the public equity of the issuing firm) when there is a private
relationship (we shall refer to these trades as “associated trades”) and when there is not
(we shall refer to these trades as “unassociated trades”). We also compare the
performance of trades associated with private equity relationships to the performance of
trades associated with private debt relationships.
Previous studies that have examined how relationships affect trading have typically
relied on quarterly data from 13F fillings by institutions (Massa and Rehman, 2008;
Ivashina and Sun, 2011). With quarterly data researchers are forced to compute changes in
holdings and calculate returns from dates (say quarter end) that may be quite different
than the date of the transaction. Our data set provides both holdings and transactions for
U.S. insurers, and allows us to know the date that an asset is purchased (or sold). By
tracking the performance of a trade from the exact date that the trade is executed, we are
better able to assess whether or not there are differences in performance between
associated trades and unassociated trades. Therefore, our data set provides an advantage
over quarterly data because we can more precisely compute returns.
An additional advantage of our study over that of prior studies is that we examine a
setting where the financial intermediary generates the information and uses it to trade, i.e.
we do not rely on a setting where there is an indirect passage of information. Other studies
that examine trading behavior from relationships argue that information is passed from an
intermediary to a trading firm such as a mutual fund or hedge fund. For example, in Massa
and Rehman (2008) the trading firm is affiliated with a bank that has a lending arm where
the information is generated. In Ivashina and Sun (2011) the trading fund is a member of a
loan syndicate but may not be the lead intermediary in the loan agreement and the
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producer of the information. In contrast, our study the insurer generates the information
and uses the information to trade.
The motivation for this study is grounded in theoretical literature on financial
intermediaries, which suggests that they have comparative advantages in generating
information via their private creditor relationships. For example, Fama (1985) argues that
financial intermediaries have access to insider information via loan and private placement
relationships compared to outsiders who rely on public information such as bond holders.
Diamond (1984, 1991) posits that financial intermediaries develop expertise in
information production from initiating and monitoring their creditor relationships.7 Thus,
the financial intermediation literature contends that establishing relationships comes with
benefits, particularly when those relationships generate information.
The literature on financial intermediation has typically focused on banks and loan
relationships, but, like banks, insurance companies are financial intermediaries who
aggregate capital and invest in projects. As financial intermediaries, insurers receive
“deposits” in the form of premiums on insurance contracts. This capital is then aggregated
and used to make investments. Insurers then choose to invest in a wide variety of financial
assets, both in public markets as well as private markets. One such private market that
insurers invest in is the market for private placements (privately placed equity and debt
instruments).
We contend that the relationships established in the private placement market
(both private debt and private equity) generate information for the investor and are similar
to the intermediary-creditor relationship. For example, the private placement market, like

7

See Boot (2000) for a review of this literature.
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the loan market, is an information intense environment where information asymmetries
between the issuer and the investor abound (Carey, Prowse, Rea, and Udell, 1993; Fenn,
Liang, and Prowse, 1995).8 To mitigate these asymmetries, investors undertake a due
diligence process to examine the issuing firm and also continue to monitor of the issuing
firm through time(Carey et al., 1993; and Fenn et al., 1995). Like banks, insurers can
generate information through the due diligence and monitoring process via disclosures by
the issuing firm and discussions with management.
We use two different approaches to measure abnormal trading performance, which
we will describe in more detail in section V below. Using the two methods, we find some
evidence that insurers do appear to generate information via their relationships and are
generally able to profit from their associated trades. In our univariate approach (based on
the method of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997) we document that insurers
appear to generate information and use the information when selling the issuers’ equity.
Additionally, in our multivariate approach, (based on the methods found in Massa and
Rehman, 2008; Pormorski, 2009; and Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski, 2010) we find that
trades associated with privately placed debt relationships earn an abnormal return and
outperform trades unassociated with a private placement. Additionally we find mixed
results that trades associated with private equity relationships outperform trades
associated with private debt relationships.
Our study contributes to three streams of literature. First, we add to the financial
intermediation literature that examines the benefits of intermediary-borrower
relationship. While early empirical evidence of the benefits in the intermediary-borrower

8

We describe the market for private placements in more detail in the following section.
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relationship focuses on the benefits to the borrower (see James, 1987; Lummer and
McConnell, 1989; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; and Berger and Udell, 1995), less is known
about the benefits to the lenders. One of the recent exceptions is Bharath, Dahiya,
Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007) who show that relationship lenders benefit from
subsequent loans to the borrowers and relationship lenders also benefit from being chosen
to provide other services such as debt/equity underwriting services. Also, the results of
Massa and Rehman (2008) suggest that banks pass information to affiliated funds. Hence,
it appears that banks benefit from information generated in the loan market and capture
this benefit in their trading divisions. We contribute to this literature by showing that
private relationships established by investing in private placements lead to benefits for the
intermediary in the form of higher trading performance in public equity. Additionally, our
investigation of which type of private asset (debt or equity) is associated with higher
performance is novel and sheds light on other types of private relationships such as equity
based relationships (i.e. non-creditor relationships).
Secondly, our results shed light on the literature that studies cross-market
information flow. Several papers examine how information is incorporated into different
asset markets. For example, Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2009) examine lead-lag
relationships between stock and bond markets. Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) report that
the informational efficiency in the bond market is similar to that in the underlying stocks.
Bushman, Smith and Wittenberg-Moerman (2010) study the channels in which information
generated in the syndicate loan market impacts price discovery in secondary loan and
equity markets. Acharya and Johnson (2007) infer how financial institutions may exploit
information of their clients in CDS markets. We extend this research by investigating a
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channel through which information spill-over between markets can occur. Specifically, we
test if information that is generated by holding a privately placed debt or equity results in
higher trading performance in that firm’s public equity. We also test if information
generation differs across the different privately placed asset types, which extends this
literature by testing whether or not information spill-over effects are more sensitive in one
type of asset than another.
Thirdly, we add to a growing literature on relationships and trading behavior. For
example, Massa and Rehman (2008) find evidence that banks affiliated with mutual funds
pass information generated in the loan market to the affiliated mutual fund to use to trade
profitably in the stock market. Likewise, Ivashina and Sun (2011) show that equity trades
of members of loan syndicates outperform the trades of non-syndicate members.
Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009) and Jegadeesh and Tang (2010) report evidence of
funds trading on inside information when they are affiliated with the bidder or target
advisor, respectively. Kedia and Zhou (2009) investigate and report that there is some
evidence that bond dealers affiliated with takeover advisors trade ahead of the
announcements. However, Griffin, Shu, and Topaloglu (2012) examine situations where
inside information is likely such as affiliation with takeover advising, IPO and SEO
underwriting, or lending relationships and find little evidence that institutional investors
use inside information to trade. We add to this literature by examining where a
relationship (established by purchasing or monitoring a privately placed asset in a firm)
generates information that can be used to trade.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the market
for privately placed securities. Section 3 sets forth our hypotheses and gives a brief review
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of the literature. Section 4 describes the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) data set that we use for our study, as well as the other data sets we use to
supplement our analysis. Section 5 presents the main results of our paper. Section 6
concludes.

2.2 The Market for Private Placements
The private placement market is a large and growing avenue for firms to raise
capital. While accurate data on the private placement market is historically sparse, Carey
et al. (1993) report that between 1935 and 1992 the market grew from $390 million to
$65.86 billion, peaking in 1988 at $127 billion (see Appendix D of Carey et al., 1993).9
Likewise, Fenn et al. (1995) report that the 1980’s and 1990’s saw a rapid growth in the
private equity market, more than doubling the levels of the 1970’s. More recently, in 2010
there was more than $1 trillion of capital raised through private placements, and it
appeared (from the first quarter of 2011) that the private placement market was on pace to
exceed $1 trillion again (Ivanov and Bauguess, 2012; and Sjostrom, 2013). The capital
raised through private markets exceeded those in public markets in both the number of
offerings as well as the total amount of capital raised (Ivanov and Bauguess, 2012).10 Thus,
the market for privately placed securities is a significant means for firms to raise capital.
A firm can issue privately placed debt or equity (common or preferred) instruments.
The term “private” refers to a security which is exempt from registration under Regulation
Carey et al. (1993) also document that between 1987 and 1992 the gross volume of privately placed bonds
was more than 60% of that issued in the public bond market, and at times has outpaced the issuance of public
bonds.
10 Ivanov and Bauguess also report that there was a preference for private markets over public markets for
public firms who can access both markets.
9
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D of the Securities Act of 1933. There are several exemptions that the law provides to
registering securities. Rule 506 of Regulation D provides the most used exemption for
issuing privately placed securities (Sjostrom, 2013). To qualify for the registration
exemption, the offering, can only be purchased by “accredited investors” defined under
Rule 501(a) of Section D to be institutions or individuals with a high net worth or high
income (Sjostrom, 2013). According to Sjostrom, the legal reasoning underlying the
registration exemption is that accredited investors are sophisticated and can “fend for
themselves.”
Firms issuing private placements typically employ an agent to help design the
securities and to locate potential investors (Carey et al., 1993; Fenn et al., 1995).11 The
process for the issuance has several steps which we summarize here, particularly as it
relates to the potential for information generation.12 Once the decision is made to issue a
private placement and an agent is appointed, the agent will conduct their own due
diligence on the issuing firm. From the agent’s due diligence process, the agent then helps
the company prepare the offering memorandum and other documents such as the terms
sheet.13 The agent’s due diligence process adds value for the investors because it acts as a
pre-screen, and much of the initial interest by the investor is based on conversations with
the agent and the offering memorandum.14 Since reputation is important in this market,
the agent is vested in generating accurate information about the issuing firm. According to
Carey et al. 1993 estimate that two thirds of private placements are assisted by an agent. The remaining
one-third are direct placements between the issuer and the investor, where no agent is involved.
12 For more detail on the process see Carey et al.,(1993) and Hayter (2010). We summarize the process here.
13 The offering memorandum is similar to a prospectus for a public issue, but typically includes more
information than is found in a prospectus such as forecasts (Carey et al., 1993). It also typically goes into
more detail than the Annual Report (Hayter, 2010)
14 The process of gaining initial interest and commitment from investors is known as “circling.” The
commitment is contingent on the lender’s (such as an insurance company) investment committee and the
investor’s own due diligence process.
11
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Carey et al. (1993) investors (primarily insurance companies) rely on the agents
information to help filter the several hundred private placements that are offered to them
each year of which only a small fraction are accepted.
Once the agent has located (“circled”) potential investors, a “road-show” may take
place. The road show is a where a few senior officers of the issuing firm visit the investor
to pitch their private placement issue (Hayter 2010). After the agent has pitched the
private placement via conversations, the offering memorandum, and perhaps a road-show,
the potential investors place bids for the issue. Once the bids are accepted the investor can
then perform their due diligence process prior to finalizing the deal (Carey et al., 1993). In
the due diligence process the investor can travel to tour the issuing firms operations, and
have access to management (Carey et al., 1993).
The private placement securities are typically marketed and sold to a small select
group of accredited investors. For example Ivanov and Baugeuss (2012) report that the
median number of investors in a particular issue is four. Therefore, investment in private
placements is highly concentrated, which can be advantageous for issuing firms because
renegotiation costs can be lower (Chandra and Nayar, 2008). Also, by issuing to a small
group of investors, firms reduce the probability that any proprietary information they
reveal to the investor will be released to other parties (Chandra and Nayar, 2008;
Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995; Yosha, 1995). Since firms issue to a small number of firms
who have comparative advantages in monitoring, the literature generally asserts that
obtaining capital via private markets is associated with a certification effect. Several
studies report evidence consistent with this assertion finding positive stock price reactions
on the announcement of a private placement (Wruck 1989; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Fields
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and Mais, 1991). While insurers are sizable players in private asset markets, they are not
the only players in the private asset markets (see Carey et al., 1993; and Fenn et al.,
1995).15 The potential for higher returns and information generation also attracts other
institutions such as pension funds and hedge funds.16
The fundamental principle of the risk-reward tradeoff suggests that with the
potential for higher returns also come potential risks. The private placement market is
information-intensive market where large asymmetries can exist between issuer and
investor that pose risks to the investor. In such markets, financial intermediaries build
capabilities to produce information regarding the issuing firm and to monitor their
investment as a means of mitigating the risks that they face. We next discuss some of the
risks faced by investors in private placement markets in more detail.
Sjostrom (2013) argues that regulatory changes in the private placement market
over the last two decades have favored firms attempting to raise capital, but have done
little to improve investor protections. From a legal perspective, investors in private
placements do not have the same recourse as investors in public issues. Investors in public
issues can sue a firm (and its officers) for misrepresentation in the prospectus under
Section 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. Private placement investors cannot sue
under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) since they do not apply to unregistered securities
(Sjostrom, 2013). Instead, private placement investors must sue under Rule 10b-5 which

Carey et al., 1993 report that 83% of the dollar volume of private placements issued in 1990-92 was held by
insurance companies.
16 A 2006 article in Business Week asserts that hedge funds have become more active in private placement
markets and that SEC has launched several probes into their activities (“More Heat On Hedge Funds,” 2006).
In December, 2012 the Tiger Asia Partners settled charges in the amount of $44 million. The SEC had charged
the founder of Tiger Asia Partners with breaking insider trading laws based on confidential information he
received in a private placement offering. (“Hedge Fund Manager to Pay $44 Million for Illegal Trading in
Chinese Bank Stocks,” 2012)
15
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requires a higher burden of proof, and thus investors in private placements face the risk of
having a more difficult time obtaining legal recourse if there is misrepresentation in the
offering documents (Sjostrom, 2013).
Investors in private placements also face risks from information asymmetries. As
we stated above, like the market for bank loans, the market for private placements is a
marketplace where potentially large information asymmetries exist between the issuer and
the investor. In fact, investors may face larger asymmetries in the private placement
market due to the differences between bank loans and private placements. Chandra and
Nayar (2008) argue that one difference that can lead to larger asymmetries is the maturity
differences between bank loans and private debt. Bank loans are usually short term (less
than a year), while privately placed debt typically matures between seven and fifteen years.
In the bank loan market where maturities are short, a bank can choose not to renew its
lending relationship if it learns that the borrower is of poor quality, while in the private
placement market the lender is “locked up” for longer periods of time. Since private equity
has no maturity and holding periods are theoretically infinite, a similar argument can be
made for larger asymmetries existing in the privately placed equity market. To mitigate
these asymmetries, investors engage in due diligence and monitoring activities.
Due in part to the informational asymmetries in the private placement market,
privately placed assets also tend to be fairly illiquid investments. Therefore, investors in
private placements face liquidity risk, where they may not be able to sell the asset when
they desire to dispose of it. The reduced liquidity and informational asymmetries lead to
issuers to typically offer their private placements at a discount. Regulatory changes and
developments in the marketplace that have occurred are aimed at improving the liquidity
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for private placements. The SEC adopted Rule 144A in 1990 in an attempt (in part) to
improve liquidity and decrease the illiquidity discount associated with private placements
by giving a regulatory avenue for resale of the privately placed security (Sjostrom, 2008;
and Sjostrom, 2013). Rule 144A allows institutions to sell previously acquired private
placements without having to register the securities (Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2004).
Additionally, Nasdaq and other investment banks have created secondary marketplaces
such as PORTAL to improve liquidity in the private placement market (Sjostrom, 2008).
While these actions may have improved liquidity in the market, there still exist large
informational asymmetries between issuer and investor which parallel those discussed in
the relationship banking literature.17

2.3 Hypotheses
2.3.1 Do private debt relationships generate information?
The relationship banking literature predicts that there are benefits for the lender to
establishing a private creditor relationship (Fama, 1985, Diamond, 1984, Diamond, 1991,
Rajan and Winton, 1995). For example, Bharath et al. (2007) report that relationship
lenders have a higher probability of getting repeat lending business from the borrower.
They also show that the relationship lender is more likely to be chosen to provide other
banking services such as underwriting of debt/equity issues.

Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2009) report evidence of the private placement discount decreasing through
time, which would be consistent with increasing liquidity within the private placement market.
17
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Another benefit is that the private information generated could be used to trade
profitably in the issuing firm’s public equity.18 The relationship banking literature asserts
that private creditor relationships generate private information through screening
(Diamond, 1991) and monitoring (Rajan and Winton, 1995, Diamond, 1984) that is not
available to non-lenders or public creditors such as public bond holders. We argue that if
the insurers obtain private information and use it to trade, then it should be reflected in the
performance of their informed trades. We seek to determine if public equity trades made
by insurers where a private debt relationship exists outperform public equity trades where
no other private relationship (such as a private equity relationship) exists. This leads us to
form our first hypothesis.

H1: Public equity trades associated with a private debt relationship outperform
public equity trades not associated with a private relationship.

2.3.2 Do private equity relationships generate information?
The literature on the financial intermediary-borrower relationship focuses on
lending/creditor relationships, but as mentioned earlier other non-creditor private
relationships exist. For example, relationships with merger advisors (a non-creditor
relationship) can produce information that is used to trade (Bodnaruk, Massa, and
Simonov, 2009; Jegadeesh and Tang, 2010). In our context, privately placed securities can
be debt or equity instruments. Therefore, private equity relationships exist between

Albeit illegally according to Rule 10b5-1. The potential for the use of material, non-public information
generated via private placement transactions has caught the eye of regulators. The SEC has an ongoing
investigation of private placement transactions, launched in 2002 (Bengtsson, Dai, and Henson, 2012).
18
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issuing firms and investors, and represent another type of non-creditor relationship.
However, according to Fenn et al. (1995) there is reason to believe that investors in the
private equity market will behave similar to the private creditor relationships we discussed
in the prior section. Private equity investors also undertake a due diligence process and
monitoring to mitigate asymmetries between them and the issuer (Fenn et al., 1995).
Therefore, the private equity relationship can generate information that could be used to
trade in the public equity of the issuing firm. We seek to answer whether or not public
equity trades associated with a private equity relationship outperform public equity trades
where no other private relationship (such as a private debt relationship) exists. We
therefore form the following hypothesis.

H2: Public equity trades associated with private equity relationships outperform
public equity trades not associated with a private relationship.

2.3.3 Are private debt or private equity relationships associated with better performance?
Theory suggests that there are differences in the information content of private
equity and private debt relationships. The pecking order theory provides insight into why
there may be differences (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Myers (1984) argues that
when asymmetric information costs to a firm are high, firms will avoid raising funds
externally when internal funds are available. If firms do raise external funds the firm will
choose the security whose value is least sensitive to inside information (Myers, 1984).
Myers’ argument leads to a pecking order where debt (the least sensitive to inside
information) is used first and then equity (the most sensitive to inside information).
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According to Myers a security is information-sensitive when the price of the security
changes in response to changes in the amount of information about a firm. Equity is more
information-sensitive (compared to debt) because the price of equity changes more in
response to information about the firm.
Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) extend the standard pecking order theory model to
incorporate the ability of investors to generate information about the issuing firm. The
Fulghieri and Lukin model is particularly applicable to the private placement market
because investors are able to generate information about the issuing firm through the due
diligence and monitoring process (Carey et al., 1993; Fenn et al., 1995; and Gomes and
Phillips, 2012). According to Fulghieri and Lukin, investors’ incentive to produce
information depends on the information-sensitivity of the security. Given that equity is
more information-sensitive than debt (Myers, 1984), investors in private equity
relationships will have a greater incentive to produce information and will produce more
information than investors in private debt relationships. Besides the increased incentive to
produce information in a private equity relationship, we contend that the informational
advantage of private equity (over private debt) will result in public equity trades of
privately placed equity holders outperforming the public equity trades of privately placed
debt holders. We therefore form the following hypothesis:

H3: Public equity trades associated with privately placed equity relationships will
outperform public equity trades associated with privately placed debt relationships.

49

2.4 Data
The primary data for this study comes from the Schedule D data from the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). We supplement the NAIC data with data
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) when we need to calculate returns
on equity trades. We choose the sample period from the NAIC data for this study to be
from 2001 to 2010. Schedule D of the NAIC data reports holdings as well as buy and sell
transactions for U.S. insurer’s general accounts. The data contain a listing, by Cusip
number, for each asset held in the portfolio. Our data set is the universe of insurers, and
Schedule D holds all bond, preferred stock, and equity holdings and transactions of the
insurer. For our study we identify privately placed assets issued by public firms, and then
identify public equity trades that occurring during the holding period of the privately
placed asset. A more detailed explanation of the data set and how we identify the privately
placed assets that we use in our study can be found in Appendix A.
The NAIC data offers three distinct advantages for investigating theories of
relationships in financial intermediation. First, our data allow us to examine the passage of
information in different types of private relationships. Since our data contains the entire
portfolio holdings and transactions (equity and debt) of insurers, we can compare
relationships such as the ones established in privately placed debt relationships compared
to privately placed equity relationships.
Second, our data provides the date on which a transaction is made, therefore, we are
able to see precise dates when the private and public assets were bought or sold (or
otherwise disposed of). This is an advantage over studies that rely on 13F filing data which
is only reported quarterly, and must infer captured returns from a date that is likely
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different from the transaction date. Our data allows us to calculate benefits accrued to the
intermediary, i.e. returns on trades in public assets in a more accurate manner.
Third, an additional advantage of data is that we can focus on the benefits gained by
the provider of capital (the intermediary), such as information generated from the
relationship. Early studies that examined relational banking focus on what could be
measured in stock prices, and the market’s reaction to announcements of a private
relationship. Examples, in this vein are James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989)
who examine the announcement effect of bank loan initiations and renewals, respectively.
Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1988) report that a stand-by letter of credit from a bank
determines whether the announcement of a commercial paper issue is positive. These
papers focus on the benefits to the borrower via the market’s favorable reaction to the
announcement.
Table 1 reports the number of privately placed assets of public firms held by
insurers. Panel A shows that life insurers held 5,880 unique privately placed debt assets
and 540 privately placed equity assets, while Property and Casualty (P&C) insurers held
1,019 privately placed debt assets and 305 privately placed equity assets, respectively. For
Life insurers, these privately placed asset holdings represented investment in 2,299 unique
firms issuing privately placed debt and 349 unique firms issuing privately placed equity.
For P&C insurers, investment was made in 712 unique firms issuing privately placed debt
and 240 unique firms issuing privately placed equity. These investments in privately
placed assets are quite diversified across industries. We classify issuing firms into one of
the 49 Fama and French industry classifications found on Ken French’s website. Table 1
reports that Life insurers during our sample period hold privately placed assets in every
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one of the 49 Fama and French industry classifications. This is also almost true for P&C
insurers who hold privately placed assets in 42 of the 49 Fama and French industry
classifications. On average, the issuers of these privately placed assets are quite large as
seen in Panel B of Table 1. The average market capitalization of the issuer is $6.8 billion
compared to the average of $2.3 billion for the CRSP database.
Not all insurers in the NAIC dataset hold privately placed assets. Thereare 414 life
insurers who hold privately placed debt and 157 who hold privately placed equity.
Likewise, there are 259 property casualty insurers who hold privately placed debt and 182
that hold privately placed equity. Of these insurers who hold privately placed assets there
are a smaller number that make trades in the public equity of the issuing firm during a
period where the insurer also held a privately placed asset of the issuing firm. For life
insurers there are 55 insurers that hold privately placed debt and trade in the public equity
of the issuing firm and 21 insurers that hold privately placed equity and trade in the public
equity of the issuing firm. For P&C insurers there are 18 and 19, respectively. On average
the insurers who hold the private asset and transact in the public equity of the issuing firm
are larger insurers. Panel C shows that the average size (measured by assets) of insurers
making associated trades is $26 billion compared to an average $1.6 billion for the NAIC
database. Our data set has 2,944 associated trades made by life insurers and 377 such
trades made by property casualty insurers.
To gain further understanding regarding the nature of the privately placed asset
holding of insurers we present Figures 1, 2, and 3 and Tables 2 and 3. Figure 1 plots the
holdings (in dollars) of privately placed debt and equity assets of life and P&C insurers,
respectively. Figure 1 shows that insurers hold a significant aggregate amount of private
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placements (approximately $80 trillion in 2010). Figure 2 reveals that for the insurers that
hold private placements, private placements make up a significant portion of their debt and
equity holdings. Among insurers that hold privately placed debt, private placements
account for an average of 7% of their total debt holdings. On average, privately placed debt
issued by public firms accounts for 2% of these insurers’ debt holdings. While private
equity placement holdings are not as common in insurers’ portfolios (see Table 1), they do
make up a significant portion of their equity portfolio. For insurers that hold privately
placed equity, on average private placements make up 48% of their equity portfolio based
on book value. Of all privately placed equity, 1% of the equity holdings are in privately
placed equity issued by public firms. Figure 3 reports the average percentage holdings for
the universe of insurers in the NAIC database as opposed to the subset of insurers that
invest in private placements. For the universe of insurers, private placements account for
1% of insurer’s debt holdings and 1% of their equity holdings.
Table 2 reports the average holding period (in months) for the asset types. The average
holding period for privately placed debt assets in our sample is approximately five years
for both life and P&C insurers.19 The holding period for privately placed equity is slightly
longer, approximately seven years, for both types of insurers. Conditional on an insurer
holding privately placed assets, Table 3 presents the average number of privately placed
assets held. Life insurers, on average, hold far more privately placed debt assets than
privately placed equity assets (51.19 debt assets compared to 5.24 equity assets). P&C
insurers, besides holding fewer privately placed assets than life insurers on average, are
more balanced with their holdings between the two asset classes (5.65 debt assets and 2.49
The holding periods we report are close to the maturities of private placements in Carey et al. (1993) who
report that maturities for private placements have mean of six to seven years.
19
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equity assets). Since insurers sometimes hold multiple privately placed assets in a single
issuer, we present panels C and D of Table 3 which holds the average number of issuing
firms insurers are invested in conditional on an insurer holding private placements. Panels
C and D shows that (conditional on holding private placements), on average, insurers have
debt relationships with 34.8 firms and equity relationships with 3.76 firms. Meanwhile,
property casualty firms have debt relationships with an average of 4.88 firms and equity
relationships with 2.08 firms.

2.5 The Performance of Trades Associated with Private Relationships
In this section we discuss how we measure the relative performance of trades
associated with private relationships, and present the results. We measure performance
using two methods, a univariate method and a multivariate method. We start our
discussion by describing the univariate approach, and then turn our attention to the
multivariate approach.

2.5.1 Univariate Approach
The first method we use to investigate the performance of trades associated with
privately placed assets is to use a univariate approach that follows Puckett and Yan (2011).
A benefit of tracking abnormal performance in this manner is that it takes advantage of a
strength of our data set. Our data allows us to calculate the returns with a level of precision
that is not possible with other data sets since we know the exact transaction date. We start
by identifying the start and end dates when an insurer holds a privately placed asset (debt
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or equity). We consider the time between the start and end date to be the period where the
insurer has a private relationship with the issuing firm. Next, we identify all public equity
trades made by the insurer that take place during a private relationship. Henceforth, we
shall refer to these trades as associated trades. All other trades that occur outside a private
relationship are termed unassociated trades.
For our analysis, we separate the trades into buys and sells. We then track the
performance of the trade over 20, 60, 120, and 240 trading days subsequent the execution
date. We calculate both holding period compound returns as well as abnormal returns for
the specified tracking periods. To calculate the abnormal return, we take the compounded
CRSP return for the specified trading periods (holding period compound return) and
subtract the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) (henceforth DGTW (1997))
benchmark return over the same holding period.
Table 4 reports the results for testing hypothesis 1 which investigates whether or
not trades associated with privately placed debt relationships outperform trades not
associated with a private relationship. Panel A reports the results for associated and
unassociated buy transactions. The results in Panel A indicate that, for tracking periods of
60 days and greater, associated trades outperform unassociated trades for the raw holding
period returns. However, the DGTW-adjusted returns show no difference between
associated and unassociated trades. Therefore, it appears that the insurers do not benefit
from information generated from the private placement relationship when making
purchasing decisions. However, the results for sell transactions in Panel B show some
evidence that the insurers benefit from information generated in the private relationship
when making sell decisions. For a 20, 120, and 240 day tracking period associated trades
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have significantly different DGTW-adjusted returns compared to unassociated trades in the
direction one would expect for sell transactions. To interpret the results consider a sale of
a stock. A successful sale of a stock would occur prior to a period of underperformance.
The results show that for a 20, 120, and 240 day tracking period, the abnormal
performance of associated trades is lower than that of unassociated trades. For example,
for a 20 day tracking period, the abnormal performance of associated trades is 47 bps
lower than for unassociated trades. Taken together, the results of Panel A and Panel B
provide mixed results on whether or not information generated via the private debt
relationship is used to trade. If information is used, it appears that insurers use negative
information to dispose of equity holdings.
Next we test our second hypothesis which asserts that trades associated with
private equity relationships outperform trades unassociated with a private relationship.
Table 5 presents the results of testing the hypothesis. Similar to the findings for privately
placed debt, we find that there is no difference between associated and unassociated
DGTW-adjusted returns. However, we do find for the 20 day tracking period that
associated sell trades exhibit abnormal performance, and outperform the unassociated sell
trades in the direction expected for sell trades. Again it appears that insurers are
generating negative information about the issuing firm and using the information to sell the
equity.
We then test the third hypothesis which asserts that trades associated with
privately placed equity relationships outperform trades associated with privately placed
debt relationships. Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. We find mixed results
when considering whether the trade is a buy or sell transaction. We find no difference in
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DGTW-adjusted returns between buy transactions associated with privately placed debt
and buy transactions associated with privately placed equity. For sell transactions,
consistent with our prior expectation, we find that sell transactions associated with private
equity outperform sell transactions associated with private debt. We find that the raw
returns are significantly different for the 20, 60, and 120 day tracking periods. Additionally
we find that the DGTW-adjusted returns for sell transactions associated with privately
placed equity outperform those associated with privately placed debt.
Overall our results of our univariate method are suggestive of information being
generated via private placement relationships and being used to time sells of the issuing
firm’s equity. At least for the selling behavior of insurers, the results are consistent with
theories of financial intermediation which argue that information is generated in private
creditor relationships. Additionally, for sell transactions the results indicate that trades
associated with privately placed equity outperform trades associated with privately placed
debt, which is consistent with investors having more incentive to produce information in a
private equity relationship.

2.5.2 Multivariate Approach
To further test the performance of trades associated with a private placement
relationship, we also use a multivariate approach to compare risk adjusted returns. Our
multivariate approach is to create calendar time portfolios of associated and unassociated
trades. This approach is used in the literature for assessing factor/risk-adjusted returns
and similar approaches can be found in Massa and Rehman (2008); Pormorski (2009); and
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Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2010). Seasholes and Zhu (2010) describe the benefits of
measuring performance using a calendar time portfolio approach.
We form calendar time portfolios that are long buys and short sells. To form the
portfolios we collect the buys and sells in the public equity over six month windows (the
portfolio formation window) and form a portfolio at the end of the portfolio formation
window. We then follow each of the trades for 60 trading days from the end of the
portfolio formation window.20 Next, for each calendar day we calculate an equal-weighted
calendar-time portfolio return. We then use standard pricing models such as the Fama and
French three factor (Fama and French, 1993), the Fama and French four-factor model
(Carhart, 1997), and the Fama and French five-factor model to measure performance (i.e.
to find alpha).21
Our first test using the multivariate approach estimates alpha for the sub-sample of
associated trades only. The goal of this analysis is to test whether or not associated trades
earn an abnormal return. Table 7 presents the results of estimating the three, four, and five
factor models for trades associated with privately placed debt (Panel A) and for trades
associated with privately placed equity (Panel B). Panel A shows that trades associated
with privately placed debt earn an abnormal return. Trades associated with privately
placed debt earn an abnormal return of 1.6 bps (1.8 bps for the five factor model) per day
which equates to approximately 4% per year (1.6 bps*250 trading days). Panel B indicates
that trades associated with privately placed equity do not earn an abnormal return.

Other tracking periods such as 20 days were also run, and the results lead to the same inference.
At the time this study was conducted CRSP only had the liquidity factor through December 2010, which
limits the number of observations used in the five factor model regressions.
20
21
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For comparison, we also examine whether or not trades that are unassociated with
a private placement relationship earn an abnormal return. The results are found in Panel C
of Table 7. We find that there is no abnormal performance for unassociated trades. The
coefficient on the intercept is not significant, and therefore indistinguishable from zero
abnormal performance. Finding abnormal performance for trades associated with
privately placed debt, while finding no abnormal performance for unassociated trades
provides initial evidence that supports hypothesis 1.
To address the hypotheses regarding whether or not trades associated with private
placements outperform trades unassociated with holding a private placement, we estimate
the multi-factor models that we describe previously. The results of estimation are reported
in Table 7. We find that there is an abnormal performance associated with privately placed
debt (Table 7 Panel A) while the performance of unassociated trades is statistically
indistinguishable from zero (Table 7 Panel C). Therefore, we conclude that trades
associated with privately placed debt outperform unassociated trades. With regard to
whether or not trades associated private equity outperform unassociated trades, we find
no evidence that there is a difference in the relative performance between the two groups
as both intercept coefficients are insignificant.
Finally, we conclude from our multivariate approach in Table 7 that trades
associated with privately placed debt outperform trades associated with privately placed
equity. We find a positive and significant abnormal return for trades associated with
privately placed debt. However, we find that the return on trades associated with privately
placed equity is not different from zero. Therefore we conclude, contrary to our prior
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expectations, that the trades associated with privately placed debt outperform trades
associated with privately placed equity.

2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we examine how investors who establish private relationships by
investing in privately placed securities produce tradeable information. We add to a
growing literature that examines how relationships influence trading performance, and we
extend the literature that suggests financial intermediaries are able to produce information
via their private relationships. We find some evidence that insurers profit from
information gained via a private placement relationship. Using a multi-factor model we
find that insurers who invest in privately placed debt instruments and subsequently trade
in the public equity of the issuing firm are able to earn an abnormal return. Additionally
from the DGTW method, we find some evidence that insurers earn an abnormal return on
sell transactions that are associated with privately placed debt and privately placed equity.
Overall, we conclude that there is some evidence indicates that insurers are able to produce
tradeable information via the process of due diligence and monitoring.
We also extend the financial intermediation literature that focuses on creditor
relationships by examining another type of relationship (equity-based relationships). We
have argued that the market for privately placed equity is similar to the market for
privately placed debt. Both markets are characterized by high degrees of informational
asymmetry and should therefore also be characterized by due diligence and monitoring by
investors. We find mixed evidence that private equity relationships are associated with
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increased trading performance. Using a univariate approach we document that sell trades
are associated with privately placed equity show some relative performance compared to
unassociated trades at the 20 day tracking period. However, we find no such performance
using a multi-factor model.
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Figure 1: Private Placement Holdings By Year

This figure plots the amount of privately placed debt and equity held by life and property casualty, respectively, in each year of the sample.
Amounts are measured by actual cost as reported in the NAIC statutory filing
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Figure 2: Public and Privately Placed Asset Holdings Conditional on Holding Private Placements
These figures show the average percentage holdings for private placements as a part of insurers’ debt and equity
portfolios,
These
figures
conditional
show theon
average
holding
percentage
private placements.
holdings for
Holding
privatepercentages
placements are
as abased
part ofoninsurers’
the bookdebt
valueand
of the
equity
asset as
portfolios, conditional on holding private placements. Holding percentages are based on the book value of the asset as
reported in the NAIC statutory filings.

Debt Holdings

Equity Holdings

Privately Placed Debt By Public Firms

Privately Placed Equity By Public Firms

Privately Placed Debt by Non-Public Firms

Privately Placed Equity by Non-Public Firms

Public Debt

Public Equity
2%

1%

63

5%

47%
52%

93%

Figure 3: Public and Privately Placed Asset Holdings Unconditional on Holding Private Placements
These figures hold the average percentage holdings for private placements as a part of insurers’ debt and equity
portfolios. Holding percentages are based on the book value of the asset as reported in the NAIC statutory filings.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for privately placed assets below are for those issued by public companies only. Panel A reports descriptive statistics
of our sample taken from the NAIC database. The sample period is from 2001 through 2010. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for
market capitalization of trades in public equity that are associated with a private placement relationship. Panel C reports descriptive statistics
for the size of insurers making associated trades.
Panel A -NAIC Data
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Life

Prop/Casualty

# of prv placed debt assets

5880

1019

# of firms issuing prv placed debt assets
# of industries represented in prv placed
debt assets
# of prv placed equity assets (Preferred
Stock and Common Stock)
# of firms issuing prv placed equity
assets
# of industries represented in prv placed
equity assets

2299

712

49

42

540

305

349

240

34

23

# of insurers holding prv placed debt
# of insurers holding prv placed equity
(Preferred and Common)

414

259

157

182

55

18

21

19

# of insurers holding prv debt and
transacting in public equity
# of insurers holding prv equity and
transacting in public equity
# of trades of common equity associated
with private relationship
Panel B - Stock Characteristics

2944
Mean

377
Median

SD

Min

Max

Market Cap of Associated Trades

$6,808,650,433

$2,908,257,961

$10,549,633,405

$5,116,500

$151,862,785,992

Market Cap of CRSP database

$2,333,439,319

$230,567,699

$12,041,245,580

$8,340

$530,426,006,557

Panel C - Insurer Characteristics
Size of All insurers in the NAIC dataset

Mean
$1,639,013,822

Median
$57,394,971

SD
$9,712,945,118

Min
$41

Max
$297,465,527,467

Size of Insurers making associated trades

$27,158,194,497

$7,071,500,281

$45,655,921,404

$7,902,162

$297,465,527,467

Table 2: Holding Periods of Private Placements
This table reports the average holding period (in months) for the different types of privately placed assets. In calculating the
holding period, if an asset is held at the end of the sample period we assume that the ending holding date is December 31, 2010.
Panel A reports the results for Life insurers and Panel B reports the results for Property Casualty Insurers.
Panel A - Life Insurers
Private Asset
N
Debt
21192
Equity
822
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Mean
64.63
77.35

Min
0
0

1st
1
0

25th
24
22

Median
48
45

75th
89
82

99th
238
540

Max
477
1238

Std
55.38
107.54

Panel B - Property Casualty Insurers
Private Asset
N
Mean
Debt
1463
58.73
Equity
454
82.56

Min
0
0

1st
0
0

25th
18
19

Median
41
45

75th
84
96

99th
269
546

Max
347
586

Std
56.30
113.54

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Private Placements
This table presents descriptive statistics for the number of private placements held conditional on holding private placements, and
for the number of issuing firms that the holdings represent. Panel A (Life Insurers) and Panel B (Property Casualty Insurers)
presents the results for the number of private placements held conditional on holding private placements. Panel C (Life Insurers)
and Panel D (Property Casualty Insurers) hold the descriptive statistics for the number of private placement issuing firms
represented in our sample. Our sample period is from 2001 to 2010.
Panel A - Life Insurers
Private Asset
N
Mean
Min
1st
25th
Median 75th
99th
Max
Std
Debt
414
51.19
1
1
3
15
52
486
1060
106.18
Equity
157
5.24
1
1
1
2
5
38
64
8.93
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Panel B - Property Casualty Insurers
Private Asset
Debt
Equity

N
259
182

Mean
5.65
2.49

Min
1
1

1st
1
1

25th
1
1

Median 75th
2
4
1
3

99th
69
19

Max
118
21

Std
12.23
3.17

Panel C – Life Insurers
Private Asset
Debt
Equity

N
414
157

Mean
34.80
3.76

Min
1
1

1st
1
1

25th
2
1

Median 75th
12
40
2
4

99th
310
28

Max
645
40

Std
64.09
5.54

Panel D - Property Casualty Insurers
Private Asset
N
Debt
259
Equity
182

Mean
4.88
2.08

Min
1
1

1st
1
1

25th
1
1

Median 75th
1
4
1
2

99th
62
18

Max
92
19

Std
10.06
2.54

Table 4: Trades associated with Privately Placed Debt
This table reports the raw and DGTW-adjusted returns for public equity trades associated with privately
placed debt assets (associated trades) and equity trades unassociated with a private placement (unassociated
trades). Panel A reports the results for Buys and Panel B reports the results for Sells. The difference between
the means for associated and unassociated trades is tested. T-stats are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A – Buys
holding period (trading days)
20
60
120
240
Associated Trades:
Raw Return
0.00384
0.0216***
0.0461***
0.1147***
(1.21)
(4.32)
(6.84)
(11.10)
DGTW Adjusted Return
-0.00197
-0.00020
-0.00231
-0.00350
(-0.76)
(-0.05)
(-0.40)
(-0.37)
n = 1,473
n = 1,473
n = 1,473
n = 1,475
Unassociated Trades:
Raw Return
0.00471***
0.0123***
0.0331***
0.0661***
(37.76)
(59.62)
(113.32)
(155.94)
DGTW Adjusted Return
0.00130***
0.00217***
0.00482***
0.00646***
(12.99)
(12.96)
(20.28)
(18.56)
n = 917,707
n = 917,713
n = 917,725
n = 917,752
Associated - Unassociated:
Raw Return
-0.00087
0.00933*
0.0130*
0.0485***
(-0.28)
(1.81)
(1.93)
(4.59)
Pooled
Pooled
Satterthwaite
Pooled
DGTW Adjusted Return
Panel B – Sells
holding period (trading days)
Associated Trades:
Raw Return
DGTW Adjusted Return
Unassociated Trades:
Raw Return
DGTW Adjusted Return
Associated - Unassociated:
Raw Return

DGTW Adjusted Return

-0.00327
(-1.26)
Satterthwaite

-0.00237
(-0.57)
Pooled

-0.00713
(-1.20)
Pooled

-0.00996
(1.06)
Satterthwaite

20

60

120

240

-0.00453
(-1.61)
-0.00241
(-1.03)
n = 1570

0.00264
(0.56)
-0.00018
(-0.05)
n = 1570

0.0296***
(4.05)
-0.00385
(-0.60)
n = 1570

0.0683***
(6.65)
-0.00609
(-0.63)
n = 1571

-0.00033**
(-2.34)
0.00231***
(20.58)
n = 933,035

0.00638***
(28.15)
0.00467***
(25.46)
n = 933,052

0.0285***
(89.28)
0.00833***
(32.14)
n = 933,071

0.0713***
(150.75)
0.0145***
(36.70.96)
n = 933,147

-0.00420
(-1.49)
Satterthwaite

-0.00374
(-0.79)
Satterthwaite

0.00104
(0.14)
Satterthwaite

-0.00298
(-0.29)
Satterthwaite

-0.00472**
(-2.01)
Satterthwaite

-0.00485
(-1.26)
Satterthwaite

-0.0122*
(-1.93)
Pooled

-0.0206**
(-2.14)
Pooled
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Table 5: Trades Associated with Privately Placed Equity
This table reports raw and DGTW-adjusted returns for public equity trades associated with privately placed
equity assets (Associated Trades) and equity trades unassociated with a private placement (Unassociated
Trades). Panel A reports the results for Buys and Panel B reports the results for Sells. The difference between
the means for associated and unassociated trades is tested. T-stats are in parentheses below. ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A – Buys
holding period (trading days)
20
60
120
240
Associated Trades:
Raw Return
-0.0329
-0.0464
-0.00107
0.0364
(-1.33)
(-1.59)
(-0.03)
(0.68)
DGTW-Adjusted Return
0.0167
0.0100
0.0223
-0.0525
(0.84)
(0.49)
(0.66)
(-1.16)
n = 115
n = 115
n = 115
n = 116
Unassociated Trades: :
Raw Return
0.00471***
0.0123***
0.0331***
0.0661***
(37.76)
(59.62)
(113.32)
(155.94)
DGTW-Adjusted Return
0.00130***
0.00217***
0.00482***
0.00646***
(12.99)
(12.96)
(20.28)
(18.56)
n = 917,707
n = 917,713
n = 917,725
n = 917,752
Associated - Unassociated:
Raw Return
-0.0376
-0.0587**
-0.0342
-0.0297
(-1.52)
(-2.02)
(-0.87)
(-0.55)
Satterthwaite
Satterthwaite Satterthwaite
Satterthwaite
DGTW-Adjusted Return
Panel B – Sells
holding period (trading days)
Associated Trades:
Raw Return
DGTW-Adjusted Return
Unassociated Trades: :
Raw Return
DGTW-Adjusted Return
Associated - Unassociated:
Raw Return

DGTW-Adjusted Return

0.0154
(0.77)
Satterthwaite

0.00788
(0.38)
Satterthwaite

0.0175
(0.52)
Satterthwaite

-0.0589
(-1.30)
Satterthwaite

20

60

120

240

-0.0798***
(-3.82)
-0.0381***
(-3.02)
n = 159

-0.0993**
(-2.34)
-0.00349
(-.98)
n = 159

-0.1045*
(-1.83)
-0.0130
(-0.27)
n = 159

0.00441
(0.08)
-0.0158
(-0.36)
n = 159

-0.00033**
(-2.34)
0.00231***
(20.58)
n= 933,035

0.00638***
(28.15)
0.00467***
(25.46)
n= 933,052

0.0285***
(89.28)
0.00833***
(32.14)
n = 933,071

0.0713***
(150.75)
0.0145***
(36.70)
n = 933,148

-0.0794***
(-3.80)
Satterthwaite

-0.1056**
(-2.49)
Satterthwaite

-0.1330**
(-2.33)
Satterthwaite

-0.0669
(-1.25)
Satterthwaite

-0.0404***
(-3.20)
Satterthwaite

-0.0396
(-1.11)
Satterthwaite

-0.0213
(-0.45)
Satterthwaite

-0.0304
(-0.69)
Satterthwaite
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Table 6: Performance of trades associated with privately placed debt compared to privately placed
equity
This table reports the raw and DGTW-adjusted returns for public equity trades associated with privately
placed debt (Associated with Debt Trades) and public equity trades associated with privately placed equity
(Associated with Equity Trades). Panel A reports the results for Buys and Panel B reports the results for Sells.
The difference between the means for trades associated with privately placed debt and trades associated with
privately placed equity is tested. T-stats are in parentheses below. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A – Buys
holding period (trading days)
20
60
120
240
Associated with Debt Trades:
Raw Return
0.00384
0.0216***
0.0461***
0.1147***
(1.21)
(4.32)
(6.84)
(11.10)
DGTW-Adjusted Return
-0.00197
-0.00020
-0.00231
-0.00350
(-0.76)
(-0.05)
(-0.40)
(-0.37)
n = 1,473
n = 1,473
n = 1,473
n = 1,475
Associated with Equity Trades:
Raw Return
-0.0329
-0.0464
-0.00107
0.0364
(-1.33)
(-1.59)
(-0.03)
(0.68)
DGTW-Adjusted Return
0.0167
0.0100
0.0223
-0.0525
(0.84)
(0.49)
(0.66)
(-1.16)
n = 115
n = 115
n = 115
n = 116
Associated Debt – Associated Equity:
Raw Return
0.0367
0.0680**
0.0472
0.0782
(1.47)
(2.30)
(1.18)
(1.43)
Satterthwaite
Satterthwaite Satterthwaite
Satterthwaite
DGTW-Adjusted Return
Panel B – Sells
holding period (trading days)
Associated with Debt Trades:
Raw Return
DGTW-Adjusted Return
Associated with Equity Trades:
Raw Return
DGTW-Adjusted Return
Associated Debt – Associated Equity:
Raw Return

DGTW-Adjusted Return

-0.0187
(-0.93)
Satterthwaite

-0.0102
(0.49)
Satterthwaite

-0.0246
(-0.72)
Satterthwaite

0.0490
(1.06)
Satterthwaite

20

60

120

240

-0.00453
(-1.61)
-0.00241
(-1.03)
n = 1570

0.00264
(0.56)
-0.00018
(-0.05)
n = 1570

0.0296***
(4.05)
-0.00385
(-0.60)
n = 1570

0.0683***
(6.65)
-0.00609
(-0.63)
n = 1571

-0.0798***
(-3.82)
-0.0381***
(-3.02)
n = 159

-0.0993**
(-2.34)
-0.00349
(-.98)
n = 159

-0.1045*
(-1.83)
-0.0130
(-0.27)
n = 159

0.00441
(0.08)
-0.0158
(-0.36)
n = 159

0.0752***
(3.57)
Satterthwaite

0.1019**
(2.39)
Satterthwaite

0.1340**
(2.33)
Satterthwaite

0.0639
(1.17)
Satterthwaite

0.0357***
(2.78)
Satterthwaite

0.0348
(0.97)
Satterthwaite

0.00915
(0.19)
Satterthwaite

0.00973
(0.22)
Satterthwaite
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Table 7: Multi-Factor Models
This table reports results of factor models for trades associated privately placed debt
(Panel A), trades associated with privately placed equity (Panel B), and trades
unassociated with a private placement relationship (Panel C). Calendar time portfolios
of trades are formed that are long the buy trades and short the sell trades. The
dependent variable is the calendar time portfolio return of associated trades. The
independent variables are the variables for Fama and French three, four, and five factor
models. The sample period is 2001 to 2010. T-stats are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Panel A: Trades Associated with Privately Placed Debt
Variable
FF3
FF4
Intercept
0.00016**
0.00016**
(2.06)
(2.09)
SMB
0.05337***
0.05684***
(4.00)
(4.23)
HML
-0.05702***
0.06004***
(-4.46)
(-4.67)
MKTRF
-0.00661
-0.01281**
(-1.13)
(-1.96)
UMD
-0.01726**
(-2.13)
LIQUID
N
R2

2,682
0.0152

2,682
0.0168

Panel B: Trades Associated with Privately Placed Equity
Variable
FF3
FF4
Intercept
-0.00013
-0.00014
(-0.38)
(-0.39)
SMB
0.26649***
0.26068***
(4.46)
(4.33)
HML
-0.65620***
-0.65052***
(-11.38)
(-11.19)
MKTRF
-0.41704***
-0.40705***
(-15.97)
(-13.97)
UMD
0.02813
(0.77)
LIQUID
N
R2

2,654
0.1544

Panel C: Unassociated Trades
Variable
FF3
Intercept
0.00001

FF5
0.00018**
(2.13)
0.06052***
(4.32)
-0.06176***
(-4.65)
-0.01001
(-1.42)
-0.01333
(-1.56)
0.00063
(0.33)
2,511
0.0177
FF5
-0.00030
(-0.80)
0.32786***
(5.31)
-0.64921***
(-10.98)
-0.31642***
(-10.26)
0.09935***
(2.64)
0.00436
(0.52)

2,654
0.1546

2,492
0.1420

FF4
0.00001

FF5
-0.00002
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SMB
HML
MKTRF
UMD

(0.48)
-0.00520
(-1.16)
-0.10973***
(-25.56)
-0.04066***
(-20.73)

(0.34)
-0.01185***
(-2.70)
-0.10394***
(-24.76)
-0.02876***
(-13.50)
-0.03312***
(-12.53)

(0.73)
-0.00742*
(-1.68)
-0.10661***
(-25.50)
-0.02000***
(-9.04)
0.04016***
(14.98)
0.00170***
(2.82)

2,682
0.3283

2,682
0.3655

2,511
0.3811

LIQUID
N
R2
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ESSAY 3: INFORMATION GENERATION, LEARNING AND THE TRADING DYNAMICS OF
INSTITUTIONAL TRADERS DURING THE 2007-2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS
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3.1 Introduction
There is considerable recent interest in institutional trading during bubble, and
subsequent crisis, periods. For example, Griffin, Harris, Shu, and Topaloglu (2011) study
how institutions appear to drive and burst the Tech bubble in early 2000, and report that
hedge funds are the most aggressive traders around the bubble period. Additionally, Cella,
Ellul, and Giannetti, (2012) examine a period around the Lehman Brothers collapse, and
find that institutions with short investment horizons liquidate more of their equity
portfolio than do investors with longer horizons. Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda (2012) show
that bond mutual funds that hold mortgage backed securities (MBS) during the 2007-2008
financial crisis sell more liquid assets in the form of corporate bonds. Manconi et al. argue
that the selling of corporate bonds by mutual funds explains how the financial crisis is
transmitted to the bond market. The aforementioned studies focus on institutional
characteristics that help explain their contribution to and trading behavior around crisis
periods.
We add to the literature that examines how institutions trade during a crisis period
by examining a unique data set that has both portfolio holdings and transactions of U.S.
insurers. We focus our analysis on insurer trading behavior around the 2007-2008
financial crisis and examine whether or not insurers learn from the assets they hold. We
argue that insurers who hold mortgages are able to acquire and process information such
as delinquencies in their own loan portfolio. We hypothesize that these insurers benefit
from this mortgage-related information and are more likely to sell MBS before the financial
crisis. Additionally, we test if information obtained from mortgage portfolios causes some
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insurers to adjust their holdings towards government bonds (a prediction made by
Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2012).
In aggregate, insurers are significant holders of both MBS and mortgages. For
example, Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda (2012) show that insurers hold more securitized
assets than mutual funds, measured by dollar volume. Additionally, insurers hold a
significant amount of mortgages in their portfolios, representing the second largest asset
class in their portfolio behind fixed income securities (Insurance Information Institute,
2011). Therefore, it is reasonable to believe insurers will be attuned to developments in
the loan markets.
Brunnermeier (2009) reports that the crisis started in loan markets as early as
February 2007, but that it was May before Moody’s put certain tranches of structured
products based on real estate on downgrade review. Ellul, Jotikasthira, Lundbald, and
Wang (2012) report that most of the downgrades of asset backed securities did not start
until the third quarter of 2007. Therefore, there appears to be a lag between when the
information in loan markets is generated and when this information is fully revealed to the
market. 22 However, investors who hold mortgages could reduce the amount of time it took

Information from issuers of MBS regarding the experience of the loan portfolio that backed MBS is acquired
with a lag. According to a joint staff report from the Department of Treasury, Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, dated January (2003) issuers of private
label MBSs must provide investors with post-offering disclosures, however, there is a lag period between the
issuer’s realization of information and the investors’ realization (receiving the report). In addition, under
Section
15(d) of the Exchange Act issuers of MBSs who have less than 300 record holders (which they state is
typically the case for private-label MBSs), the issuer may discontinue post offering disclosures. Therefore
there is at a minimum some lag period between when issuers of the securities report delinquencies,
prepayments etc. There is also a time lag for reporting, for example, by the Federal Reserve reporting
foreclosures numbers at the state level.
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to acquire information.23 If they learn from their mortgage portfolio, then they can use this
information to reduce their exposure to other real estate they hold in the form of MBSs.
Insurance companies provide an ideal setting for studying how institutional trading
behavior in one asset (MBSs) is influenced by holdings of another asset (mortgages).
Insurance companies hold substantial amounts of both mortgages and MBSs. The statutory
filing of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) reports the detailed
year-end holdings of mortgages and MBSs for each licensed U.S. insurer. In addition to the
year-end holdings, the NAIC data includes a detailed listing of the transactions of the assets
during the year. The detailed holdings and transactions data is a unique feature of the
NAIC data that is not found in other institutional data sets such as 13F fillings (which
reports quarterly holdings only) or Ancerno (which reports detailed transactions but no
holdings data).
Following Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundbald, we define the financial crisis for MBS to
start in the third quarter of 2007. We document that insurers do appear to learn from their
mortgage holdings in the pre-crisis period. We find that insurers who hold mortgages are
more likely than those insurers who do not hold mortgages to reduce their MBSs holdings
in the eighteen months leading up to the start of the financial crisis. At the onset of the
crisis, we find no evidence that insurers who hold mortgages sell with as much urgency as
those who do not hold mortgages. Additionally we find that insurers as a group exhibit a
flight to safety during the financial crisis, increasing the percentage of their fixed income
portfolios that is held in governments bonds. However, we find that those insurers who
There is good reason to believe that lending relationships, such as mortgages, are special and generate
information for the lender (Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985). Even though the mortgages held by insurers were
obtained in the secondary market (thus precluding information generation via underwriting), insurers could
still generate information through the monitoring process.
23
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hold mortgages do not exhibit a flight to safety, and actually reduced the percentage that
government bonds made up of their fixed income portfolios.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop
our hypotheses to address the idea of learning from holding an asset, and how insurers use
this information to trade around the financial crisis. Section III describes the data set that
we use for our study. Section IV presents our results, and section V concludes.

3.2 Hypothesis Development
3.2.1 Did insurers learn from mortgage holdings and time the financial crisis?
There are a number of influential papers, both theoretical and empirical, that
consider how institutions trade during periods of mispricing, which in the extreme
manifest as crisis periods. 24 Early work, arguing for the efficiency of capital markets, such
as Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965) theorizes that sophisticated investors trade against
irrational agents to eliminate mispricing. In contrast, there is now substantial literature on
the limits to arbitrage that explains why periods of mispricing can persist. This literature
argues that market frictions such as noise trader risk (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and
Waldmann, 1990) or synchronization risk (Abreu and Brunnermeier 2002, 2003) may
make it optimal to attempt to ride a bubble. For example, in Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2002) rational arbitrageurs will attempt to time the market and delay their arbitrage
because they are uncertain of when other rational investors will start attempting to correct
mispricing. In their model, a single arbitrageur cannot correct mispricing by himself.

Empirical papers in this vein, such as Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin, Harris, Shu, and
Topaloglu, (2011) have used the tech bubble of the late 1990’s and generally found that institutions rode (and
burst) the bubble.
24
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Mispricing is only corrected when a critical mass of arbitrageurs act together, which
creates a coordination problem. If a trader realizes that he cannot correct the mispricing
by himself, then he may choose to “ride the bubble” until the point at which a critical mass
of traders exists to trade against the bubble.
The aforementioned literature makes predictions how rational, informed investors
trade when mispricing exists. Institutional traders are typically considered to be rational,
informed investors. Given that insurers are a class of institutional investors, we relate the
trading behavior of insurers to the predictions made in these models.
In addition to the models that make predictions regarding informed trading
behavior during bubble and crisis periods, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) build a model that
describes why investors become informed. In Grossman and Stiglitz, investors can choose
to acquire information and learn from this information. We argue that insurers who hold
mortgages are able to acquire information similar to the investors in the Grossman and
Stiglitz model. Insurers who hold mortgages acquire information from their mortgage
portfolio by monitoring things such as late payments and default rates. We contend that
insurers who become more informed via their mortgage holdings should be in a better
position to know that they should exit the bubble, and will be more likely to exit the bubble
prior to the financial crisis.25 Therefore, we form the following hypothesis:

H1: The likelihood of reducing MBS exposure prior to the crisis is greater for
insurers that hold mortgages than for those who do not.

There is also some empirical evidence that supports the idea of investors learning. Seru, Shumway, and
Stoffman, 2010) find that some individual traders do appear to learn, and become better with trading
experience, while some learn that they have poor ability and stop trading.
25
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Additionally, since rational arbitrageurs are competitive in the Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2002) model, an arbitrageur who waits too long will miss the chance to
trade (if the price corrects in the interim). Hence, Abreu and Brunnermeier emphasize an
element of urgency to trade once the crisis starts. To address the urgency suggested by the
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) theory, we examine if some insurers trade with more
urgency at the onset of the financial crisis (where there is a critical mass of traders trading
against the mispricing). If some insurers can acquire information and learn, as in the
Grossman and Stiglitz model, then we expect that some will act with more urgency. We
contend that insurers who hold mortgages will act with more urgency to sell once they
realize that a critical mass of traders is starting to trade against the mispricing. We
measure the urgency with which traders act via a Cox Proportional Hazard model that
measures time until an event. In this case, for each firm-security combination the event
will be selling the security. The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses:

H2: insurers that hold mortgages will seek to sell after the onset of the crisis with
more urgency than those that do not hold mortgages.

3.2.2 Did insurers exhibit a flight to safety?
There are several theoretical models that consider which assets institutions choose
to trade during periods of market stress. For example, models by Vayanos (2004) and
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) describe trading by financially constrained institutions
(e.g. institutions facing redemptions) when there is a market disruption. Generally, the
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aforementioned literature makes the following argument. A fund faces a crisis such as a
drop in performance due to a market downturn or a crisis in a particular security such as
MBS. Investors in the fund demand their money back, causing large outflows for the fund
in the form of redemptions. The fund faces a Scholes (2000) liquidation problem and must
then choose which assets to sell to cover the redemptions. The empirical results of
Manconi et al. (2012) support these theories by showing that mutual funds that face
redemptions choose to sell more liquid corporate bonds at the onset of the financial crisis.
While Vayanos (2004) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) make predictions of
trading behavior for financial constrained institutions, Gennaioli et al. (2012) model
institutional trading behavior in a framework where there is no financial constraint (such
as redemptions). The lack of a financial constraint on the institution in the Gennaioli et al.
model is applicable to insurers who do not face the same funding flows problem that other
institutions face (Manconi et al., 2012).26 We argue that an insurer’s funding flows should
not be as sensitive to its portfolio performance as what funding flows are for other
institutions such as mutual funds and hedge funds.27 The Gennaioli et al. model makes a
prediction of which assets an unconstrained institution will choose to buy (instead of sell)
when faced by a crisis in a particular asset such as MBS.
Gennaioli, et al. (2012) contend that their model predictions reflect the events of the
financial crisis. In the setup for their model they argue that a decrease in government debt
during the Clinton administration creates a shortage in supply of safe assets, i.e.
Funding flows refer to where mutual funds and hedge funds must raise capital (inflows) and at times
redeem this capital for investors (outflows). The analog for insurers is that they raise capital through the
selling of insurance policies (inflows), and must at times redeem these policies in the form of losses
(outflows).
27 We argue here that insurers are less likely to be impacted, but we will still control for the insurers’
premiums and losses as we detail in the Methodology section.
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government bonds. Financial engineers then create MBS as AAA rated substitutes for
government bonds. The MBS are believed to be safe, but at some point bad news enters the
market and investors realize that the MBS are not good substitutes for the government
bonds. Investors then shift demand back to government bonds in a “flight to safety”
mechanism.
The initial prediction from the Gennaioli et al. model is that prior to the financial
crisis, before bad news enters the market, there is increased demand for MBS that mimic
the safe cash flows of the government bonds. We test the prediction of increased demand
for MBS prior to the crisis, and expect that prior to the crisis we should observe that
insurers are large net buyers (demanders) of MBS. Therefore, we form the following
hypothesize.

H3: Prior to the crisis there was an increase in demand for MBS by insurers.

According to the Gennaioli et al. model, the increase in demand for the MBS is
followed by bad news entering the market and a subsequent flight to safety, where
investors no longer demand MBS and instead demand government bonds. To test if insurer
trading exhibits a flight to safety, we examine insurer holdings across the financial crisis.
As we argue above, the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model allows some investors to learn
and acquire information. We expect some insurers, those who hold mortgages, may be able
to acquire and process information in their mortgage portfolio, and receive the bad news
earlier. If they receive the bad news earlier, we hypothesize that they realize that MBSs are
not good substitutes for government bonds, and exhibit a stronger flight to safety. We
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therefore form the following hypotheses to test our assertion and the predictions of the
Gennaioli et al. model:

H4: After the onset of the crisis, insurers’ trading behavior is consistent with a flight
to safety.
H5: After the onset of the crisis, insurers that hold mortgages exhibit trading
behavior that is more consistent with a flight to safety.

3.3 Data
To answer our primary research question, regarding whether or not information is
generated in one asset (mortgages) that can be used to trade better in other assets (MBSs),
we need detailed institutional holdings and transaction data for both assets. The Insurance
industry is an excellent laboratory for testing our research questions because all licensed
U.S. insurers are statutorily required to report detailed underwriting and investment data,
including mortgage and MBS holdings and transactions. These (quarterly and annual)
statutory reports are submitted to insurers’ state insurance commissioners, who in turn
submit these data to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for
aggregation. The NAIC data have been used in the finance literature by Bessembinder,
Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006) to study market transparency around TRACE
implementation and Lin, Wang, and Wu (2011) to study liquidity risk and bond returns.
In addition to being subject to unique investment reporting requirements, insurance
companies provide an ideal setting for testing the aforementioned theories regarding
institutional trading behavior around financial crises because they do not have the same
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confounding effects that other institutions might have, such as funding liquidity constraints
or short investment horizons. For instance, there are numerous theoretical models that
investigate exogenous shocks to institutions and its ability to fund itself (e.g. capital
withdrawals by investors in a mutual fund).28 Generally, these models predict an asset
substitution where institutions trade (sell) liquid assets, instead of illiquid ones, in order to
relieve the funding constraint. These models typically focus on institutions such as hedge
funds or mutual funds that are subject to high variation in inflows and outflows of funding
capital. In comparison, insurer funding capital (inflows and outflows) arises through the
collection of premiums and payment of losses on policies, and these funding flows should
not be as sensitive to the insurers’ portfolio performance as mutual funds and hedge funds
funding flows to their portfolio performance.29 Besides the sensitivity to funding liquidity,
there are other institutional characteristics, such as short investment horizons, that are
theorized to play a role in trading decisions (see Allen, Morris and Shin, 2006; DeLong et al.,
1990; Dow and Gorton, 1994; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1992; Stein, 2005; and Tirole,
1982). These theories predict that, short horizon traders make trading decisions based on
their short horizon and organizational structures, instead of longer run movements in
value.30 Insurers have a relatively long horizon compared to other institutions, and
therefore are likely not influenced by the short horizon strategies emphasized in these
See Brunnermeier (2009) for an insightful discussion of examples of these type of shocks. He draws the
distinction between funding liquidity (the ability of a firm to finance itself) and market liquidity (the ability
dispose of assets). Brunnermeier provides several examples of funding liquidity shocks. For other models
that generate financial crisis from funding liquidity shocks see, for example, Gromb and Vayanos (2002),
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Diamond and Rajan (2009), Froot (2009), Geanakoplos (2010),
Krishnamurthy (2009). Generally, in these models funding shocks to the institution causes an amplification
process that depresses prices and/or market liquidity, which in the extreme cause asset fire sales and
financial crises.
29 We argue here that insurers are less likely to be impacted, but will still control for it and capture the
heterogeneity among insurers as we detail further below.
30 Cella, Ellul, Giannetti (2012) provides empirical evidence of the short investment horizons influencing
trading behavior.
28
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papers. However, there is heterogeneity in the investment horizon of insurers that will be
controlled for in our analysis.
For the purposes of this study, we use Schedule B of the NAIC data that reports
mortgage holdings at year end and transactions throughout the year. Schedule B provides
information about their portfolio experience such as the mortgages which are in good
standing, mortgages which are 90 days past due but not in foreclosure, and mortgages that
are in foreclosure. For each loan held in the portfolio, the NAIC data reports the type of
mortgage (Residential, Farm, Commercial, or Mezzanine), the city and state where the
mortgage is located, the date acquired, the rate of interest, appraisal value, and the date of
the last appraisal.
Schedule D reports holdings and transactions of debt instruments (bonds, assetbacked securities, etc), preferred stock and common stock in the insurers’ general account.
Having year end holdings and transactions that occur throughout the year allows us to
infer the insurer’s quarterly holdings. For each asset held in the portfolio the NAIC data
reports the CUSIP number of the asset, a description of the asset, a book value, a fair value
(the value that the asset could be sold for at the time of reporting), the actual cost (what the
insurer paid for the asset including any transaction costs), the date the asset was acquired,
and the NAIC designation.31 The level of detail of the NAIC data set is not found in other
publicly available institutional data sets, where answering our research questions would be
infeasible.32

The NAIC designation is a one to six value assigned by the NAIC where assets with NAIC designation of one
has the highest credit ratings.
32 For other studies that use the NAIC data see Campbell and Taksler (2003), Schultz (2001), Bessembinder,
Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006), Ericsson and Renault (2006) and Lin, Wang, and Wu (2011)
31
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While the NAIC data has the benefit of providing the holdings and transactions for
the mortgages and MBSs, there are a few limitations. We are dependent on the insurer
accurately classifying the MBS into the correct line numbers designated for reporting
holdings of MBSs in Schedule D of the statutory filing. Also, in some instances other asset
backed securities based on assets such as airplane or car leases may be reported in a range
of line numbers that also hold MBSs. To remove asset backed securities not based on
mortgages we apply a series of filters based on key words such as “airplane,” “auto,” etc.
Finally, the NAIC report does not provide security specific characteristics, and therefore we
cannot control for security specific characteristics in our analysis.
To test our hypotheses, we select our sample period to be from 2001 to 2010 which
allows us to capture the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis period. We define the crisis period
to be from the end of second quarter 2007 to fourth quarter 2009. We choose this period
because in May of 2007 is when Moody’s announced that they were putting certain
structured products on downgrade review. Ellul, Jotikasthira, Lundbald, and Wang (2012)
report that most asset backed securities were downgraded within this period with
downgrades starting in the third quarter of 2007. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for
our data set. There are 5093 insurers listed in the NAIC database of which there are 3394
who hold MBSs and 893 who hold mortgages. Figure 1 plots the holdings (measured as
book value) of MBSs and mortgages for all insurers. Both MBSs and mortgages are reduced
later in the sample period, but mortgages appear to be reduced with a lag compared to
MBSs.
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The mortgages that insurers hold are geographically diverse. There are 508
insurers who hold mortgages in the five states most affected by foreclosure.33 Panel B of
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the mortgage holdings. Conditional on holding
mortgages, insurers hold an appraised value of $1 billion of mortgages on average. In
unreported results, we find that for insurers who hold mortgages, 9.2% of their invested
assets are mortgages, on average. As a percentage of appraised value held, insurers have
21.46% of their mortgage holdings in the five states most affected by foreclosures.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the mortgage backed securities holdings.
Panel A reports that life insurers hold more MBSs than do property casualty insurers.
Conditional on holding MBSs, life insurers hold $777,245,685 on average while property
casualty insurers hold $86,921,002 during our sample period. This is consistent with Life
insurers holding more fixed income securities than property casualty insurers. Panel B of
Table 2 pools life and property casualty insurers and reports the holdings of mortgage
backed securities by year. Insurers increased their holdings of mortgage backed securities
through 2007 before starting to reduce their holdings in 2008. Increasing holding from
2001 to 2007 provides initial evidence consistent with the Gennaioli et al. model that
predicts increased demand for mortgage backed securities prior to the crisis.

3.4 Methodology and Results
3.4.1 Did insurers learn from mortgage holdings?
To test our first hypothesis which asserts that insurers who held mortgages were
able to skillfully trade around the crisis, we start by splitting our data to consider only the
A Federal Reserve report in 2011 shows that the five states most affected by foreclosure are Arizona,
California, Florida, Nevada, and Michigan (Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit, 2011).
33
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pre-crisis period. We select the eighteen months prior to the start of the crisis, January
2006 to June 2007, and then test whether or not insurers were net acquirers or net
disposers of MBSs in the weeks leading up to the crisis. To find if an insurer was a net
acquirer or net disposer, we use the transactions files from Schedule D of the NAIC filings.
We aggregate the MBSs that an insurer acquired or disposed of during each week of the
pre-crisis period, and then take the difference of the two amounts (measured by actual
cost). An indicator variable, NetDisposerMBSj,t, is created that is one if firm j was a net
disposer of MBSs during week t, and zero otherwise. The following binary choice model is
used, which is estimated using Logistic Regression:

where MortgageVariablei,j is one of four mortgage holdings variables (HeldMort,
HeldMostAff, lnAmtMortHeld, or lnAmtHeldMostAff) that we use in our analysis.34 HeldMort
is an indicator variable that is one if the insurer holds mortgages and zero otherwise.
HeldMostAff is an indicator variable that is one if the insurer holds mortgages in one of the
five states (AZ, CA, FL, NV, and MI) most affected by foreclosure. lnAmtMortHeld is the
natural log of the book value of mortgages the insurer holds. lnAmtHeldMostAff is the
natural log of the book value of mortgages that the insurer holds in the five states most
affected by foreclosures.
The subscript “i” on MortgageVariable goes from 1 to 4 and shall denote one of the four mortgage variables
(HeldMort, HeldMostAff, lnAmtMortHeld, or lnAmtHeldMostAff).
34
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We also include a series of firm specific characteristics to control for the effect of
these on the probability of being a net disposer or MBS prior to the crisis. lnAssets is
natural log of the insurer’s assets and controls for the size of the insurer. We argued
previously that insurers have relatively long investment horizons compared to other
market institutions; however we still capture the heterogeneity within insurers by
including a variable (Turnover) that measures portfolio turnover in our model
specification. We include an indicator variable (Life) that is one if the insurer is a Life
insurer and zero otherwise. This variable controls for differences between Life and
Property Casualty insurers, including but not limited to the different accounting treatments
between the firms (see Ellul et al., 2012). Insurance companies can have two forms of
ownership, stock or mutual, which have been shown to have different incentive conflicts
(Mayers and Smith, 1981). Therefore, we also control for whether the firm is organized as
a stock or a mutual (Mutual). Insurers are not as sensitive to funding constraints as some
other market institutions, but we still include a variable that measures insurer funding
liquidity by including the ratio of premiums collected to losses incurred (premlossratio). To
control for how well the insurer is capitalized we include the Risk-Based Capital Ratio
(RBC). Finally, the variable lnAmtMBSheld is the natural log of the amount of MBSs the
insurer holds. We include lnAmtMBSheld to control for the possibility that insurers who
hold a lot of MBSs are more likely to become net disposers of MBSs in the pre-crisis period.
Henceforth, we will use these firm specific control variables in subsequent models as well,
but ask the reader to refer back here for definitions of the variable.
Table 3 reports the results of estimating the model. Coefficients are reported as log
odds ratios, and standard errors are cluster corrected at the firm-level. The coefficient on
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HeldMort indicates that insurers who hold mortgages have higher odds to sell MBSs prior
to the crisis. Insurers who hold mortgages have higher odds of being a net disposer of
MBSs in the pre-crisis period of 1.13 times (

). Additionally, insurers who hold

mortgages in the five states most affected by foreclosure have higher odds of being a net
disposer of MBSs of 1.3 times (

). Our continuous mortgage holding variables indicate

that insurers that hold more mortgages (or more mortgages in states affected by
foreclosure) are more likely to be net disposers. Overall, our result is consistent with
insurers learning from their mortgage holdings and disposing of MBSs prior to the crisis
when many of the MBSs were downgraded.
If insurers are able to learn from their mortgage holdings then they may also trade
with more urgency once there is a realization that there is a crisis. To address the second
hypothesis that asks if insurers who may be better informed (by holding mortgages) traded
with more urgency at the onset of the crisis, we use a Cox Proportional Hazards model. The
model is a duration analysis technique that measures time until an event and has been used
in the finance literature to model the rate of limit order execution (Lo, Mackinlay, and
Zhang, 2002 and Cho and Nelling, 2000) and to study limit orders that are rapidly cancelled
(Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009).35 A proportional hazards model allows us to study which
group of insurers sell their MBSs with more urgency at the onset of the crisis, and provides
a richer analysis than using a dichotomous dependent variable that indicates if the insurer
sells. We specify the following model:

Duration models are also referred to as Survival Analysis and are frequently used in epidemiology and
biostatistics where the typical hazard is time until death.
35
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where logh(t) is the hazard for insurer j and measures the duration from the start of the
crisis to the time of the first sell made by an insurer.36 We measure time to sell from the
start of the crisis period i.e. end of the second quarter 2007 because this is when turmoil in
the mortgage market was being realized publicly by investors and rating agencies started
downgrading MBSs (Ellul, Jotikasthira, Lundbald, and Wang, 2012). Informed traders
should trade with a sense of urgency because as Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) point out
that, “an arbitrageur who waits too long misses the profit opportunity if the price
correction occurs in interim …”. MortgageVariablei,j is one of our four mortgage variables
(HeldMort, HeldMostAff, lnAmtMortHeld, or lnAmtHeldMostAff) described earlier. We
control for the insurer characteristics described in the previous models.
The results of estimating the model are found in Table 4. The coefficients are
reported as hazard ratios. The hazard is defined as the rate at which an event (selling a
MBS) occurs measured in units of time (trading days). A hazard ratio is the ratio of the
hazard of one group (insurers who hold mortgages) to another (insurers who do not hold
mortgages). The hazard ratio for one of our mortgage variables (HeldMort, HeldMostAff,
lnAmtMortHeld, or lnAmtHeldMostAff) can be interpreted as the rate (or urgency) with
which insurers who hold mortgages (or hold more mortgages) sell MBSs as a ratio of the
rate at which insurers who do not hold mortgages sell MBSs. Considering all of our
36

The use of “(t)” following a variable indicates that the variable is a time variant predictor.
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mortgage variables, we find no evidence that insurers who hold mortgages are more likely
to sell with urgency than insurers who do not hold mortgages (i.e. a hazard ratio greater
than 1 which is statistically significant). Where we do find significance (at the 10% level)
on the HeldMort variable, the result suggests that insurers who hold mortgages do not sell
as quickly at the start of the crisis as those who do not hold mortgages. The hazard of
insurers who hold mortgages selling their MBSs is 0.788 times that of insurers who do not
hold mortgages. Our results are inconsistent with our hypothesis two, perhaps because
insurers who hold mortgages were more likely to dispose of MBSs in the pre-crisis period.

3.4.2 How did insurers trade around the crisis?
Turning our attention to testing Hypothesis 3, 4, and 5 which test the predictions
from GSV (2012), we focus on the asset holdings of insurers. Recall, that GSV model
predicts that there is increased demand for MBSs (the new security) in the years leading up
to the crisis. Bad news enters the market and the investor then demands the traditional
security (the government bond) in a flight to safety episode. Again, we are interested in
whether insurers who held mortgages engaged in a more pronounced flight to safety than
those who did not hold mortgages.
To address the first prediction from Gennaioli et al. regarding increased demand for
MBSs, we look at all insurers and determine whether or not insurers were net acquirers or
net disposers of MBSs in the years leading up to the crisis. To find whether or not an
insurer was a net acquirer or net disposer, we use the transactions files from the NAIC
filings. Similar to our process described earlier, we aggregate the MBSs that an insurer
acquired during the course of the year. We then aggregate the MBSs that the insurer
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disposed of during the year. We then take the difference of the amount (measured by
actual cost) of MBSs acquired during the year and the amount of MBSs disposed of during
the year. Figure 2 charts the net acquisitions and disposals by year for insurers as a group.
Prior to the crisis insurers were net acquirers, i.e. demanders, of MBSs. Therefore, the
results of Figure 2 are consistent with the prediction from Gennaioli et al. that investors
demanded MBSs prior to the crisis.
To address whether insurer trading behavior is consistent with a flight to safety, and
particularly whether or not those insurers who held mortgages did this to a greater extent,
we examine the percentage of an insurer’s fixed income portfolio that is held in
government bonds. Using the transaction files from the NAIC data we recreate each
insurer’s quarterly fixed income holdings, and calculate the percentage that is government
bonds. We then estimate the following fixed effects models; 37

37

Results of a Hausman test indicate that a fixed effects approach is appropriate.
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where the dependent variable Hj,t is the percentage of insurer j’s fixed income portfolio
held in government bonds, in quarter t. In the first model, we seek to test hypothesis 4,
which asserts that insurers trading behavior is consistent with a flight to safety. With the
second model, we are testing Hypothesis 5, which asserts that insurers who hold
mortgages exhibit trading behavior more consistent with a flight to safety. In the models
above, MortgageVariablei,j represents one of our four measures for holding mortgages
(HeldMort, HeldMostAff, lnAmtMortHeld, or lnAmtHeldMostAff) that we have defined
previously. The variable MortgageVariable*Crisis is an interaction term of the mortgage
variable and Crisis. The variable Crisis is an indicator variable that is one if the date is
within the crisis period (July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2009) and zero otherwise. The other
control variables in the model are the same as described previously. In both specifications,
we include firm fixed effects (not shown) and report firm cluster corrected standard errors.
Table 5 reports the results of estimating the models. The results in column [1]
indicate that insurers did exhibit a flight to safety. Insurers increased their percentage
holdings of government bonds by 7% during the crisis period. In columns [2] through [4]
we consider insurers who hold mortgages. The results in column [2] indicate that insurers
who hold mortgages during the crisis do not exhibit a flight to safety. Insurers who held
mortgages during the crisis reduced their government bond holdings by 3.2%, a result
inconsistent with hypothesis 5. The effect appears to be larger for insurers who hold
mortgages in the five states most affected by foreclosures, reducing their holdings by 4.3%
during the crisis period. Our continuous measures of mortgage holdings result in similar
results. The more mortgages insurers hold during the crisis period is associated with
reducing government bond holdings.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we examine how insurers trade around the 2007-2008 financial crisis
and contribute to a growing literature regarding institutional trading during crisis periods.
Specifically, we ask whether or not insurers who hold mortgages trade differently than
those insurers who do not hold mortgages and infer learning from holding mortgages. We
also examine if insurers exhibit a flight to safety during the crisis.
We find that insurers who hold mortgages are more likely to dispose of their MBS
holdings in the eighteen months leading up to the financial crisis. This result is consistent
with insurers learning from their experience in their mortgage holdings. We then examine
the period following the onset of the crisis, and find no evidence that insurers who hold
mortgages sell with more urgency than those who do not hold mortgages. Instead we find
slight evidence that insurers who hold mortgages do not sell as quickly as those who do not
hold mortgages. This result is contrary to our prior expectation, but may be a result of
insurers who hold mortgages and disposing of MBSs with higher likelihood in the pre-crisis
period. Insurers who hold mortgages may have needed fewer reductions to their MBS
portfolio at the onset of the crisis.
We also test the Gennaioli et al. model that predicts increased demand for MBSs in
the pre-crisis period and a flight to safety at the onset of the crisis. Consistent with their
model, we document that insurers are net acquirers (net demanders) of MBSs in the precrisis period. We then examine whether or not insurers exhibit a flight to safety at the
onset of the crisis. We document that insurers do exhibit a flight to safety, increasing the
percentage of their fixed income portfolio that they hold in government bonds. However,
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we also hypothesized that insurers who hold mortgages would exhibit behavior that is
more consistent with a flight to safety. We document that the opposite is true, finding that
insurers who hold mortgages reduce the percentage of their fixed income portfolios held in
government bonds in the crisis period.
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Figure 1: MBS and Mortgage Holdings
This figure reports the average amount (measured as book value) of MBSs and mortgages for all
insurers
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Figure 2: Net Aquisitions and Disposals of MBSs
This figure presents net acquisitions and disposals of MBSs (in $billions) for insurers over the period
2001 to 2010. The data is taken from the transaction files found in Schedule D of the NAIC statutory
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for our sample period of 2001 to 2010. Panel A holds counts of various descriptive
statistics of our data set. Panel B holds descriptive statistics for the mortgage data found in Schedule B on the NAIC filing.
Values in Panel B are conditional on the insurer holding mortgages.
Panel A -NAIC Data
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Number of insurers in the NAIC
database
Number of insurers who held
mortgages
Number of insurers who held
mortgages in the 5 states most
affected by foreclosure
Number of insurers who held MBSs

5,093

Number of Agency MBS identified

207,059

Number of Private-Label MBS
identified
Average Maturity of MBS (years)

95,775

Panel B - Mortgage Data

Mean

St Dev

Min

Median

Max

Average Amount Held (Book Value)

$506,769,258

$2,255,410,339

$0

$8,700,000

$40,695,906,405

Average Amount Held (Appraisal
Value)
Average Percent Held in 5 most
affected states (measured in Book
Value)
Average Percent Held in 5 most
affected states (measured in Appraisal
Value)

$1,020,885,911

$4,466,363,553

$0

$17,450,000

$84,389,422,842

21.5659%

27.3571%

0.000%

14.8816%

100.0000%

21.4573%

27.1044%

0.000%

14.1308%

100.0000%

893
508
3,394

23.20

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for MBSs
This table presents results for the amount of mortgage backed securities held conditional on holding mortgage backed securities. Panel A reports the
results by insurer type. Fair_Val is the Fair Value reported in the NAIC database. The Fair Value represents the value marked to market at the end of a
reporting period. Actl_Cost is the sum of the Actual Cost reported in the NAIC filings. Actual Cost represents the cost of the asset plus transaction costs.
Panel B presents the amount of holdings by year. Our sample period is 2001 to 2010.
Panel A - MBS holdings by Insurer Type
Insurer
Variable
N
Mean
Type
Life
Fair_Val
7,409
$754,333,056
Property/
Casualty

Min

25th Pctl

Median

75th Pctl

Max

Std Dev

$0

$3,641,355

$35,907,485

$254,243,071

$72,234,022,403

$3,242,289,629

Actl_Cost

7,409

$777,245,685

$0

$3,660,581

$36,242,990

$257,071,123

$71,938,793,208

$3,351,242,896

Fair_Val

16,802

$85,469,441

$0

$1,813,463

$8,961,787

$41,622,255

$11,203,381,299

$382,600,071

Actl_Cost

16,802

$86,921,002

$0

$1,814,000

$9,025,091

$41,871,685

$11,315,837,133

$391,498,427
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Panel B - MBS holdings by Year
year
N

Mean

Min

25th Pctl

Median

75th Pctl

Max

Std Dev

2001

2,504

$211,883,892

$0

$1,916,881

$9,294,530

$56,980,305

$41,308,320,468

$1,234,620,231

2002

2,498

$237,851,512

$0

$1,979,313

$10,374,216

$60,595,436

$46,140,455,497

$1,429,744,278

2003

2,451

$259,073,692

$0

$1,816,587

$10,227,389

$64,035,677

$51,688,636,209

$1,640,890,477

2004

2,463

$279,039,475

$0

$1,733,297

$10,619,636

$68,308,152

$54,455,696,121

$1,758,606,193

2005

2,435

$312,749,516

$0

$2,198,574

$12,075,808

$73,974,362

$58,299,382,925

$1,935,812,353

2006

2,406

$335,412,950

$0

$2,343,873

$13,446,183

$78,515,747

$59,577,277,422

$2,102,750,286

2007

2,377

$355,658,109

$0

$2,445,957

$15,276,434

$82,925,337

$63,443,943,916

$2,166,297,011

2008

2,361

$342,348,032

$0

$2,725,911

$16,066,905

$81,215,530

$68,675,046,553

$2,134,850,664

2009

2,355

$334,695,035

$0

$2,633,543

$14,545,658

$80,113,811

$70,726,820,167

$2,246,318,944

2010

2,361

$322,595,212

$0

$2,349,962

$13,130,536

$71,855,083

$71,938,793,208

$2,207,501,501

Table 3: Probability of Disposing in Pre-Crisis Period
This table presents the results of estimating the following Logistic Regression model for the pre-crisis
period (January 1,2006 to June 30, 2007):

The dependent variable is 1 if the insurer was a net disposer of mortgage backed securities for a particular
week and zero otherwise. MortgageVariable is one of our four variables for holding mortgages (HeldMort,
HeldMostAff, lnAmtMortHeld, or lnAmtMostAffHeld). HeldMort is an indicator variable that is one if the
insurer holds mortgages and zero otherwise. HeldMostAff is an indicator variable that is one if the insurer
holds mortgages in one of the five states most affected by foreclosures (AZ, CA, FL, NV, and MI) and zero
otherwise.
lnAmtMortHeld is the natural log of the amount of mortgages an insurer holds.
lnAmtMostAffHeld is the natural log of the amount of mortgages held in the five state most affected by
foreclosures. lnAssets in the natural log of the insurer's assets. The variable Turnover measures the
turnover of the insurer's portfolio. Life is an indicator variable that is 1 if the insurer is a Life insurer and
zero otherwise. Mutual is an indicator variable that is one if the insurer is organized as a mutual insurer
and zero otherwise. PremToLoss is a ratio of the insurer’s premiums to losses. RBC ratio is the risk-based
capital ratio for the insurer. lnAmtMBSheld is the natural log of the amount of mortgage backed securities
that the insurer holds. Standard errors are firm cluster corrected and are reported in parentheses.
Statistical significance is noted by asterisks. * is significant at 10% level. ** is significant at 5% level. *** is
significant at 1% level.
iNetDisposer
iNetDisposer
iNetDisposer
iNetDisposer
Intercept
-6.134***
-5.924***
-6.050***
-5.895***
(0.173)
HeldMort

(0.180)

(0.180)

(0.186)

0.126***
(0.044)

HeldMostAff

0.264***
(0.048)

lnAmtMortHeld

0.009***
(0.003)

lnAmtMostAffHeld

0.014***
(0.003)

lnAssets

0.158***
(0.010)

0.147***
(0.011)

0.153***
(0.011)

0.145***
(0.011)

Turnover

0.023**

0.023**

0.023**

0.022**

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.010)

0.141***

0.104***

0.129***

0.110***

(0.039)

(0.037)

(0.039)

(0.037)

0.008

0.004

0.006

0.005

(0.042)

(0.042)

(0.042)

(0.042)

-0.000***

-0.000***

-0.000***

-0.000***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.089***
(0.004)
216,548

0.089***
(0.004)
216,548

0.089***
(0.004)
216,548

0.089***
(0.004)
216,548

Life
Mutual
PremToLoss
RBC Ratio
lnAmtMBSheld
Obs
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Table 4: Selling After the Onset of Crisis
This table presents the results of estimating the following proportional hazard model:

The dependent variable is the log hazard time for insurer j and asset m, where hazard time is the
duration from the start of the crisis (start of third quarter 2007) to the first sell.
MortgageVariable is one of our four variables for holding mortgages (HeldMort, HeldMostAff,
lnAmtMortHeld, or lnAmtMostAffHeld). HeldMort is an indicator variable that is one if the
insurer holds mortgages and zero otherwise. HeldMostAff is an indicator variable that is one if
the insurer holds mortgages in one of the five states most affected by foreclosures (AZ, CA, FL,
NV, and MI) and zero otherwise. lnAmtMortHeld is the natural log of the amount of mortgages
an insurer holds. lnAmtMostAffHeld is the natural log of the amount of mortgages held in the
five state most affected by foreclosures. lnAssets in the natural log of the insurer's assets. The
variable Turnover measures the turnover of the insurer's portfolio. Life is an indicator variable
that is 1 if the insurer is a Life insurer and zero otherwise. Mutual is an indicator variable that is
one if the insurer is organized as a mutual insurer and zero otherwise. PremToLoss is a ratio of
the insurer’s premiums to losses. RBC ratio is the risk-based capital ratio for the insurer.
Coefficients are reported as hazard ratios. Chi-Square statistics based on robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted by asterisks. * is significant at 10%
level. ** is significant at 5% level. *** is significant at 1% level.
Heldmort
0.788*
(3.833)
HeldMostAff
0.856
(1.413)
lnAmtMortheld
0.990
(2.013)
lnAmtHeldMostAff
0.993
(0.746)
lnAssets
0.928***
0.924***
0.930***
0.923***
(14.338)
(14.907)
(10.984)
(12.838)
Turnover
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
(0.0169)
(0.025)
(0.020)
(0.027)
Life
1.151
1.106
1.136
1.096
(1.737)
(0.923)
(1.267)
(0.707)
Mutual
0.821**
0.820**
0.823**
0.820**
(4.053)
(4.119)
(4.016)
(4.127)
PremToLoss
1.000***
1.000***
1.000***
1.000***
(11.577)
(12.735)
(11.976)
(12.921)
RBC Ratio
1.000
1.000
1.00
1.000
(0.029)
(0.003)
(0.009)
(0.001)
lnAmtMBSheld
1.003
1.003
1.002
1.002
(0.193)
(0.160)
(0.129)
(0.139)
Obs

825,313

825,313
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825,313

825,313

Table 5: Flight to Safety during Crisis
This table presents the results of estimating the following fixed effects models for the entire sample
period (2001 to 2010):

The dependent variable is the quarterly percentage of the insurer's fixed income portfolio that is held in
government bonds. MortgageVariable represents one of the four measures for mortgages (HeldMort,
HeldMostAff, lnAmtMortHeld, or lnAmtHeldMostAff). HeldMort is an indicator variable that is one if the
insurer held mortgages and zero otherwise. HeldMostAff is an indicator variable that is one if the
insurer held mortgages in one of the five states most affected by foreclosures (AZ, CA, FL, NV, and MI)
and zero otherwise. lnAmtMortHeld is the natural log of the amount of mortgages an insurer holds.
lnAmtMostAffHeld is the natural log of the amount of mortgages held in the five state most affected by
foreclosures. MortgageVariable*iCrisis is an interaction term between one of the four mortgage
holdings measures and Crisis where Crisis is an indicator variable if the date is between July 1, 2007 and
December 31, 2009. lnAssets in the natural log of the insurer's assets. The variable Turnover measures
the turnover of the insurer's portfolio. Life is an indicator variable that is 1 if the insurer is a Life insurer
and zero otherwise. Mutual is an indicator variable that is one if the insurer is organized as a mutual
insurer and zero otherwise. PremToLoss is a ratio of the insurer’s premiums to losses. RBC ratio is the
risk-based capital ratio for the insurer. lnAmtMBSheld is the natural log of the amount of mortgage
backed securitites the insurer holds. We also include firm fixed effects (not shown). In column [1] we
report the results of estimating the first model. In column [2] through [5] we estimate the second model
that includes one of the four measures of mortgage holdings. Standard errors are firm cluster corrected
and are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted by asterisks. * is significant at 10%
level. ** is significant at 5% level. *** is significant at 1% level.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
%Govn
%Govn
%Govn
%Govn
%Govn
Bonds
Bonds
Bonds
Bonds
Bonds
Intercept
1.518***
1.517***
1.516***
1.516***
1.516***
(0.083)

(0.083)

HeldMort*Crisis

-0.032***

HeldMort

(0.006)
-0.006

(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.006)
Heldmostaff*Crisis

-0.043***
(0.006)

Heldmostaff

-0.005
(0.008)

lnAmtMortHeld*Crisis

-0.002***
(0.000)

lnAmtMortHeld

-0.000
(0.000)

lnAmtHeldMostAff*Crisis

-0.003***
(0.000)
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lnAmtHeldMostAff

-0.000
(0.001)

Crisis

0.070***

0.075***

0.074***

0.076***

0.075***

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

-0.063***

-0.063***

-0.063***

-0.063***

-0.063***

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.025

0.025

0.025

0.025

0.025

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.016)

-0.000***

-0.000***

-0.000***

-0.000***

-0.000***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.000***

0.000***

0.000***

0.000***

0.000***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.008***

-0.008***

-0.008***

-0.008***

-0.008***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

Obs

100,833

100,833

100,833

100,833

100,833

R2

0.057

0.057

0.057

0.057

0.057

lnAssets
Turnover
Life
Mutual
PremToLoss
RBC ratio
lnAmtMBSHeld
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Appendix A: Data Description
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) data set reports that
we use in our study is a comprehensive data set of all licensed insurers in the United States.
All licensed insurers are required to complete the statutory filings each year. Schedule D of
the statutory filings reports all fixed income, preferred equity, and common equity
investments of insurers. Several prior studies use the NAIC Schedule D data mainly to
study the corporate bond market (see for example Schultz, 2001; Campbell and Taksler,
2003; Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson, 2005; Bessembinder, Maxwell, and
Venkataraman, 2006, Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundbald, 2011). Prior to the TRACE database,
the NAIC data was one of the only sources of bond transactions data.38
The NAIC data is a unique institutional data set. Unlike other institutional data sets
such as holdings based on 13F, the NAIC data provides both the year-end holdings as well
as the transactions that occur throughout the year. The holdings and transactions data are
for all asset types (e.g. fixed income, preffered equity, common equity) in which an insurer
invests. The insurer is identified by a unique company code and the assets are identified by
a Cusip number.
In addition to the company and asset identifiers, the holdings data provides the
amount of holdings in par value (for fixed income) or number of shares held (for equity),
fair value and actual cost. The fair value represents the marked to market value of the asset

Several researchers argue that the NAIC data is a good source for bond transaction data, as insurers make
up a substantial portion of the corporate bond market. For example, Schultz (2001) reports that insurance
companies hold up to 40% of investment grade bonds. Similarly, Cambell and Taskler (2003) report that
insurance companies hold about one third of the outstanding corporate bonds. Additionaly, Bessembinder,
Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) report that insurance companies accounted for 12.5% of dollar trading
volume in the last six months of 2002.
38
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at the time of the statutory filing. The actual cost represents the amount paid (including
transactions cost) for the asset. The data also contain the date the asset was acquired.
The NAIC transaction data also provides company and asset identifiers as well as
the date of the transaction, the direction of the trade (buy or sell), par value (or number of
shares sold), the name of the vendor or dealer, and the actual cost (including transactions
costs). Having both the holdings and the transactions data provides a couple of advantages
for our study. First, by combining transactions and holdings we are able to identify exact
holding periods of private placements.
We are also able to identify the public equity trades that take place during a period
where the insurer holds the private placement in the same firm. Being able to identify the
date that a trade takes place in the public equity gives us an advantage over other studies
that use quarterly holdings and must infer the date the trade takes place. This allows us to
be more precise in our return calculations.
We identify holdings of private placements by the presence of a #,*, or @ in the
Cusip number of the asset. While the majority of private placement holdings are in nonpublic firms, there are still substantial investments in privately placed assets of public
firms. For this study, we focus only on the privately placed assets issued by public firms,
and from here on any references to privately placed assets shall refer to only those
privately placed assets issued by public firms. If the privately placed security is issued by a
publicly traded firm, then the #,*, or @ occurs in the 7th or 8th position of the Cusip number,
where the first 6 digits identifies the issuing firm.
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